Asbarez: What TRIPP Actually Commits

A sign welcomes visitors to Armenia’s Syunik Province at its historic fortress


BY DR. KEVORK HAGOPJIAN, ESQ.

The TRIPP Framework Agreement is 7 pages long. It was signed days before the elections in Armenia. Both facts justify careful reading. What does Armenia actually receive under the TRIPP Framework Agreement that is legally guaranteed, enforceable, and not contingent on future political developments outside its control? That question deserves a precise answer.

Start with the ownership architecture. Under Article 3(2), the TRIPP Development Company (TDC) will be controlled 74 percent by TDC US, a Delaware-incorporated subsidiary of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Armenia holds 26 percent. Armenia contributes sovereign territory, transit corridors, land acquisition obligations at its own financial cost, regulatory facilitation, and political risk exposure.

What does the U.S. side guarantee in return? Article 5(6) answers plainly: the United States “intends to provide for and/or assist in securing financing for TRIPP Projects, subject to the availability of funds.” An intent subject to fund availability is not a commitment. It is an aspiration dressed in treaty language.

Even more troubling is the imbalance between binding and non-binding obligations. Armenia “shall,” “agrees,” and “confirms”: it must facilitate legislation, permits, regulatory processes, land acquisition, concessions, tax exemptions, and private border-service arrangements. By contrast, the U.S. often merely “intends” or “expects,” including with respect to financing, authorization, and implementation. This is not a technical drafting issue. It is the legal core of the problem: Armenia assumes concrete sovereign obligations, while many anticipated benefits remain conditional, future-oriented, and politically dependent.

In addition, the sovereignty framing throughout the agreement is emphatic but functionally hollow. Armenia “retains full sovereignty” over TRIPP implementation areas, the document repeats. And yet Article 6(2) grants the TDC exclusive land use and development rights for an initial 49-year term, extendable to 99 years, fully assignable to Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) populated by concessionaires, contractors, and operators of the TDC’s choosing. Article 4(3) explicitly empowers the TDC to select those third parties. Armenia has no enforceable veto. In other words, the flag stays Armenian; but operational control does not.

Article 5(5) compounds this. It provides that in any conflict with Armenian law, this Agreement applies, consistent with the Constitution. This is not a standard treaty supremacy clause. Combined with Article 3(6), which commits Armenia to adopt “deviations” from its own legislation on joint-stock companies, procurement, and public-private partnerships, it creates a tailor-made legal regime for TRIPP that overrides ordinary Armenian statutory protections on transparency, competition, and anti-corruption oversight. Future parliaments will inherit these obligations on a 99-year horizon.

Several additional provisions compound the asymmetry. Article 6(1) requires Armenia to expropriate, clear, and deliver land within TRIPP implementation areas (including privately held parcels) entirely at its own financial cost, with no reimbursement mechanism and no ceiling on that expropriation liability defined anywhere in the agreement. Article 8(3) commits Armenia to using private operators for customer-facing border services within TRIPP areas, without requiring that those operators meet Armenian national security vetting standards or excluding beneficial ownership by parties whose interests may be adverse to Armenia’s, a significant omission on a frontier of acute strategic sensitivity.

Article 9 establishes comprehensive tax exemptions for the TDC structure (no dividend tax, no capital gains tax, no transfer tax) with no reciprocal fiscal mechanism returning value to the Armenian state beyond its 26 percent stake, whose actual worth depends entirely on financing commitments the agreement does not guarantee. And while Article 3(7) explicitly protects U.S. ownership of TDC US from third-party acquisition, no equivalent protection prevents adverse third-party participation in Armenian SPVs through subcontracting, financing arrangements, or intermediary corporate structures. Furthermore, there is no binding arbitration or dispute resolution mechanism should disputes arise (Article 10 provides only for consultations). Each of these provisions, taken alone, might be negotiable. Taken together, they describe a consistent pattern.

The asymmetry becomes geopolitically stark also when one examines what TRIPP does and does not operationalize. Azerbaijan’s objective, unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan through Armenian territory, is institutionalized through concrete infrastructure rights, concession structures, and dedicated governance mechanisms. Armenia’s “reciprocal benefits,” by contrast, appear nowhere as enforceable entitlements. There is no treaty-binding language guaranteeing Armenian transit rights through Azerbaijani territory, no commitment to lift the Turkish-Azerbaijani transportation blockade, and no minimum investment threshold that must be met before Armenia’s obligations activate. 

A framework that concretely institutionalizes one party’s primary strategic gain while leaving the other’s dependent on future political goodwill is not an incomplete agreement awaiting implementation. It is a completed agreement that favors one party. The reversion clause, the reserved matters, and the sovereignty affirmations are genuine provisions, but they operate within a governance structure where 74 percent controlling ownership, New York-governed shareholders arrangements, and U.S.-selected concessionaires define the practical reality of decision-making. Formal protections that exist inside a structure designed around foreign majority control are not the same as enforceable parity.

Critics will note correctly that Azerbaijan is not a party to this agreement and that demanding enforceable Armenian transit rights through Azerbaijani territory within a U.S.-Armenia bilateral instrument is legally misconceived. That is true,  but it sharpens rather than resolves the concern. The Framework Agreement’s own preamble identifies enabling connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan as a central strategic purpose. Armenia is therefore assuming concrete, binding, 99-year infrastructure obligations whose primary strategic beneficiary is a third party not bound by this instrument.

The tripartite Washington understandings of August 2025, which did involve Azerbaijan, generated political commitments regarding reciprocal Armenian connectivity. Those commitments have not been converted into any binding legal instrument before Armenia signed. The sequence matters: Armenia’s obligations are now treaty-locked; the reciprocal benefits remain politically contingent.

To remain legally objective, it is fair to acknowledge that Armenia has not been negotiating from strength, and no legal critique changes that geopolitical reality. U.S. government’s development finance backing and returning infrastructure represent real, if long-term, benefits. But strategic vulnerability is not an argument for signing without scrutiny, it is an argument for scrutinizing more carefully. A state with limited leverage cannot afford to discover after ratification that its obligations were binding while its benefits were not. Armenia’s pursuit of connectivity, prosperity, and regional integration through TRIPP is legitimate and necessary.

The question this article raises is not whether Armenia should engage, it is whether the current legal architecture of that engagement adequately protects Armenian interests and sovereignty, and whether ratification should proceed before that question is properly addressed. Seven pages have been signed. Ninety-nine years have not yet begun.

Dr. Kevork Hagopjian, Esq. is an attorney and human rights advocate with expertise in international law, minority rights, civil litigation, and community engagement. He holds a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Vienna, along with two LL.M. degrees in Public International Law from SOAS, University of London and U.S. Law from George Mason University as well as an LL.B. from University of Aleppo. His doctoral research led to the publication of a book on “The rights of Armenian minorities in Lebanon and Turkey under National and International law”. In addition to legal practice, he facilitates dialogue and peacebuilding efforts in divided or post-conflict communities. With experience spanning legal, intergovernmental, nonprofit and civil society sectors, Dr Hagopjian remains actively engaged in global conversations on justice, accountability, and human dignity.




The Missing Mountain on the Stamp


8th Century BC Urartan Inscription Located in Today’s Azerbaijani Territory


For a small country like Armenia, this will be a catastrophic, gross mistake. Where is it?

June: 5, 2026

(90-95)% of agricultural products produced in Armenia are sold in Russian markets. That agricultural product quality properties and product appearance generally do not meet the international standards of the EU and other developed countries, and a significant part of the population in Russia is not solvent and is unable to buy high-quality agricultural products at a high price and is forced to buy our local products cheaply. Diversification, finding new markets and buyers and meeting the international standards of new countries is not an easy task. Also, if you exit the market in that country, someone else will quickly take your place.

Now, about Armenia’s EU integration. We all want to integrate into the developed and civilized EU family, it’s a very good desire and aspiration, but leaving the political part of that process aside, let’s try to see what kind of agriculture we have, do we need the EU at all or not, and will it accept us into its family or not? Today, our country’s agriculture is in a poor, underdeveloped state, in particular, more than half of the country’s arable land is degraded and not cultivated, the water supply system is in a poor state, the existing agricultural machinery is outdated, the products do not meet EU standards, etc. On the other hand, integration into the EU the process is quite lengthy and not easy.
Now let’s try to understand what is the state of agriculture in the Eastern Partnership countries that want to integrate into the EU.

in 2026 Ukraine The EU has earmarked 12 million euros for agriculture and rural development, as well as food security reforms. With that money, the EU will support small farmers and help Ukraine’s legislation and practices to bring agriculture, food safety, animal health, phytosanitary policy into line with EU standards.

in 2026 to Moldova By allocating 60 million euros of financial support, the EU is financing the adaptation of Moldovan agricultural products to EU standards, the active integration of farmers into the EU market, turning Moldova into a major exporter of agricultural products, particularly plums. The EU supports the modernization of Moldova’s agricultural sector with grants and loans.

In previous years of Georgia the EU has made large financial investments in the field of agriculture. Currently, it is actively modernizing through the ENPARD program, supporting the creation of cooperatives and the introduction of European quality standards. Georgia has EU candidate status and the DCFTA agreement gives it access to the European market, although political processes affect the pace of integration. The EU is actively supporting Azerbaijan to the agricultural sector, financing projects for small farmers, cooperation with Slow Food, and is a major lender. However, the EU’s strict sanitary regulations often prevent certain products from being imported.

Now let’s try to see how the political processes in some of these countries affected agriculture.

In order to support Ukraine, the EU allowed Ukrainian agricultural products to enter the territory of EU countries without restrictions (without inspection and taxation) and for sale. The latter provoked the anger of farmers in EU countries and became one of the main reasons for the implementation of EU farmers’ demonstrations. In order to support Georgia, when Georgian wines were sent back from the Russian markets, the EU allowed these wines to enter the territory of the EU countries without restrictions.

Perhaps, Pashinyan was also promised in the EU to allow the import of Armenian fruits and vegetables to the EU markets, but the question arises: how competitive will the Armenian fruits and vegetables be in the markets of the EU countries, and will their selling prices be profitable?

2025 in August, Azerbaijan sent a large shipment of tomatoes by truck to Russia for sale, but Russia did not accept it and sent it back, after that the shipment was sent to the EU country Bulgaria, but the EU did not accept it, citing that it did not meet EU phytosanitary norms, and the trucks overloaded with tomatoes had to return. As a result, a large batch of tomatoes spoiled and was thrown away. The same process is being carried out in Armenia today, and a large batch of tomatoes from Armenia was sent back across the border.

Some people jokingly say: let Armenia send its tomatoes to Azerbaijan “Trump’s way” and Azerbaijan send its tomatoes to Armenia in the same way. Russia has announced that it will apply the blockade to any fruits and vegetables exported from Armenia.

Since 2014, Russia has implemented an embargo, banning the import of a number of food products (beef, pork, poultry, sausages, seafood, vegetables, fruits and dairy products) into Russia. The farmers of the EU countries came out against that decision. They were also dissatisfied and started protests against the import and sale of cheap and low-quality agricultural products from the MERCOSUR (South American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, etc.) associated common market to EU countries.
Summing up, I should mention that I am of the opinion that we should not escalate relations with Russia, we do not want to get involved in the Russia-West conflict, instead, we want to have good relations with all countries, and Leaving Russia’s agricultural market at once for a small country like Armenia would be a catastrophic, gross mistake, as a result of which our country’s economy could collapse.

Sargis Sedrakyan
Chairman of Farmer Movement NGO,
Strategic programs
Chairman of the Civil Cooperation Network




Businessmen, I warn you, be careful. Another trap is set. Ashot

June: 5, 2026

The EU will provide 50 million euros to Armenia, as the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said during a telephone conversation with Nikol Pashinyan yesterday, “Regarding the measures to ease the trade of some Armenian products, in particular, agricultural food products. And regarding the practical support of the affected sectors, such as Armenian flowers.”

According to him, the restrictions applied by Russia to Armenia are nothing but economic pressure, and it is unacceptable.

“Europe firmly stands by Armenia. We are preparing a support package.” noted Layen.

At the last session of the government, a decision was made to give compensation for one month to those people who could not export their crops during this period. It is not clear what these people should do with their crops in the following months.

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Former Deputy Minister of Agriculture Ashot Harutyunyan by definition, this is another decision made hastily by the Government, without serious economic justifications and economic assessment.

“From today, I warn our businessmen that this is going to be another serious dispute, then criminal cases, in any case, let them be careful. another trap is set. It is very strange for me, for example, the size and price of the subsidy, if they subsidize the price of 1 kilogram of strawberries by 770 drams, where is the calculated and confirmed cost price? What damages did they suffer or will suffer that they want to compensate?

The strawberries were returned by couriers, which is no longer subject to export, there are no relevant documents to submit to the Ministry of Economy in order to receive the compensation. Here they will divide again, they will turn against each other again, they will create grounds for criminal cases.” of 168.am Ashot Harutyunyan said in a conversation with

According to our interlocutor, this government will not exist after June 7, and they will not continue to provide this support economically, because the budget is empty, debts have increased. And the 50 million dollars mentioned by the president of the EU Commission did not come to Armenia immediately, it still needs to be approved.

“You are doing another action to support yourselves, because the middle-level businessmen here will definitely not win, you will hear the sound of this. Call it whatever you want, I consider this a pre-election promise, which will not be fulfilled along with the rest of the promises. “According to my information, yesterday they started paying the subsidies for autumn wheat from last year, they brought so much tension and they are transferring money 1-2 days before the elections,” said Ashot Harutyunyan.

Our interlocutor raises a rhetorical question: if the apricots and cherries are fully harvested, where will they be exported and sold, is there enough compensation money in the budget?

“I don’t believe them politically, because they are liars from top to bottom, it’s time for them to go.

I always say that we have gone through a lot of ups and downs, and this is another test. This is not only the EU-EEU problem, it has a price that must be paid. I am sure that if the EU is ready to support Armenia and they don’t want to put Armenia to the test once again, if they don’t want to turn it into a second Ukraine, then where was it during the 44-day war, where were they, even with their political statements, to encourage the war, to tie Aliyev’s hands? “There was no political announcement or support, which means this is another deception,” he stressed.

 Details in the video of 168.am




The future of the “3 3” format. What does the real interest of Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi depend on?

June: 5, 2026

Although Moscow has toughened the rhetoric towards official Yerevan, simultaneously applying economic restrictions, Russia hopes that the next meeting at the level of foreign ministers of the South Caucasus “3 3” format (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and their three neighbors Russia, Turkey, Iran) will be held in Baku or Yerevan. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin announced at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. “As we understand, the negotiations on this issue continue between our Azerbaijani and Armenian partners,” he said.

RA Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told the media last year that the next meeting in the “3 3” format could take place either in Yerevan or Baku. “The Republic of Armenia has expressed its readiness to host the regular ministerial meeting of the “3 3″ regional consultative platform. The Republic of Azerbaijan also expressed a similar willingness,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the media. To date, however, there is no exact information about holding the platform meeting in Yerevan or Baku.

“I would especially like to welcome the participation of the representative of Georgian expert circles in our discussion. For us, as for all participants of the platform, Georgia remains an important partner, without which the prospects of “3 3″ are unlikely to be complete. I hope that over time official Tbilisi will also join our work,” added Galuzin.

Official Tbilisi regularly announces that Georgia will not participate in meetings in this format. From Moscow, however, they continue to declare that the doors of the “3 3” format are always open for Georgia. In addition, Moscow has been announcing for months that the next meeting in this format will be held in Yerevan and Baku, but the meeting in this format never takes place.

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Russian analyst Vladimir Yevseyev of 168.amtold that the Russian announcement on holding the meeting of the “3 3” platform in Yerevan or Baku once again emphasizes the discontinuity that exists in this format.

According to him, although the Russian side tries to present the failure of the meeting as a purely technical or logistical problem related to the choice of the host city, in reality the reasons are deep geopolitical. He also drew attention to the current situation in Armenian-Russian relations, as well as Armenia’s desire to join EAEU and EU.

Yevseyev believes that in general nothing surprising happens, the processes are a logical continuation of each other, the lack of agreement between Yerevan and Baku or the months-long negotiation on this topic is not the result of organizational incompetence, but the tactical steps of the parties, where each has its own calculations in the new architecture of the South Caucasus.

“With these delays, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are solving the problem of weakening or at least limiting the influence of Russia and Iran in the region in their own way.

At this stage, the “3 3” format is promoted by Moscow and Tehran as a tool to block the access of extra-regional powers to the South Caucasus and to solve all issues at the “local level”, where they have a decisive voice. Avoiding or postponing meetings in this format, Yerevan and Baku do not allow these two powers to fully control the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement process and dictate their own agenda. And the main reason is very simple, because there is active cooperation with the West, the USA and the EU,” Yevseyev said.

According to him, the postponement of the meeting for Armenia fits into the logic of diversification of foreign policy and deepening of relations with Western partners.

According to Yevseyev, Yerevan seeks to avoid platforms that are only under the influence of Russia and Iran, because they limit the involvement of the West in the region, especially in a situation where Armenia wants to maintain only the economic agenda with Russia, seeking to maintain membership in the EAEU, but having an agenda for EU membership. He clarified that if the West is actively working to strengthen its own agenda, isolating Russia and Iran, then why should it be interested in the development of a new format?

“Therefore, neither Yerevan nor Baku is interested in “3 3”, the Russian Federation understands this very well, but does not give up on that format, because at some stage it may be necessary, and at some stage positions may change.

On the other hand, Azerbaijan, although outwardly in favor of the withdrawal of extra-regional forces, is also not interested in the strengthened positions of Russia or Iran. Baku prefers direct, bilateral negotiations with Armenia without any mediator. Therefore, this diplomatic “dead end” created around “3 3″, although it is not accidental, it shows the changed geopolitical architecture in the South Caucasus,” he said.

Speaking V:about the lack of interest of Russia, the analyst said that the lack of interest in the “3 3” format in the case of Georgia has fundamental political grounds due to the lack of diplomatic relations with Russia.

“It is difficult for Tbilisi to imagine participating in a platform where Moscow is a key player, but this position can be transformed over time if Georgia’s positions are softened. Russia initially believed that Georgia would participate in the format and not be left out of regional cooperation, but Georgia began to strengthen contacts with Yerevan and Baku. Although I should note that this positioning can change,” Yevseyev noted.

The analyst believes that along with all this, the factor of Turkey should not be ignored, which, being one of the initiators of the “3 3” format, is more inclined to activate Ankara-Baku-Yerevan direct or tripartite connections than to act on a common platform with Moscow and Tehran.

“Ankara also seeks to maximize its own influence in the South Caucasus, and the weakening of the positions of Russia and Iran fits into the context of Turkish geopolitical interests. As a result, a situation is obtained where the freezing of the “3 3″ format, albeit with different motives, is beneficial to almost all the main regional players,” he said.

Armen Ashotyan was arrested

Armen Ashotyan, the RPA vice-chairman, was also arrested a little while ago. Eduard Sharmazanov from RPA informs about this.


“Armen is being arrested. After the defeat of yesterday’s debate, the regime switched to the plan to capture him,” he wrote.


VERELQ reported that Arman Sahakyan from RPA was also arrested this morning.

Armenia-US Officially Sign TRIPP Agreement

Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan sign a strategic agreement regarding TRIPP at Zvartnots Airport on May 26


TRIPP Development Company to be Financed by New $2.5 Billion Initiative

The United States and Armenia have officially signed a strategic cooperation agreement regarding the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity—TRIPP—projects, which were reached last week when Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefly visited Armenia.

“Pursuant to the implementation of the understanding reached in Yerevan on May 26, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed the Agreement remotely. The Agreement was signed by the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington on June 1, and by the Foreign Minister of Armenia in Yerevan on June 4,” Armenia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Thursday.

“This is another important step in realizing the Armenia-US vision of a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Armenia and region,” Yerevan’s official announcement said.

In a video post, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that the document was ready to be submitted for approval, presumably by parliament, which will change following Sunday’s election.

In a related matter, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) Board of Directors on Thursday approved $2.5 billion in new strategic investments aimed at strengthening U.S. supply chains, expanding U.S. energy exports, supporting regional peace and stability, and bolstering economic cooperation.

While that project focuses on U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, it specifically mentions building the “flagship” Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity Development Company “to further peace,” said DFC CEO Ben Black.

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