Iran’s Ambassador to Armenia Khalil Shirgholami described the Armenia–Iran border as a “border of peace,” emphasizing its continued stability despite ongoing regional conflict involving Iran.

Speaking after visiting the border crossing, Shirgholami said there are no major disruptions, noting ongoing coordination between border, customs and security authorities on both sides. He added that no unusual incidents have been recorded and that traffic flows remain orderly, with recent declines in cargo volumes linked to Nowruz holidays rather than security concerns.

The ambassador also highlighted ongoing cooperation projects in southern Armenia, including meetings with Syunik Governor Robert Ghukasyan and inspections of infrastructure initiatives such as the Agarak–Kajaran road, the Kajaran tunnel and a power transmission line currently under construction.

Addressing the broader situation, Shirgholami said conditions within Iran are “not critical,” despite ongoing hostilities involving the United States and Israel. He stressed that public life continues normally, while acknowledging significant casualties, with more than 3,000 people reportedly killed since late February.

He expressed gratitude for humanitarian aid sent from Armenia, describing it as a sign of “warm friendship” between the two countries. He also confirmed casualties within Iran’s Armenian community, including the death of Hovhannes Simonyan in Isfahan.

Shirgholami noted that humanitarian needs remain high, particularly for medical supplies, and said Iran is documenting damages and will seek accountability under international law while prioritizing recovery efforts.

—

On April 1, Maria Zakharova, the Spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated at a briefing that Moscow is not engaged in negotiations with either Astana or Yerevan regarding the transfer of the concession for managing Armenia’s railways to Kazakhstan. Referring to remarks made on March 30 by Andrei Nikitin, the Transport Minister of Russia, she emphasized the importance of considering expert-level assessments. “It is very important to take into account what was made at the expert level—I mean, at the level of the relevant department… this expert statement,” Zakharova stated.

She also recalled that the concession agreement for the South Caucasus Railway, signed in 2008, has a duration of 30 years with the possibility of a 10-year extension. According to her, South Caucasus Railways CJSC has consistently fulfilled its obligations, while Russian investments in Armenia’s railway infrastructure have exceeded 30 billion rubles. Commenting on potential high-level negotiations, Zakharova added that such matters are traditionally addressed by the presidential administration.

Addressing another issue, Maria Zakharova stated that Russia is ready to cooperate with Armenia in countering “hybrid threats” if there is mutual interest from the Armenian side. She made this remark in response to comments by Ararat Mirzoyan, the Foreign Minister of Armenia, who did not rule out benefiting from Russia’s experience in this field.

Zakharova подчеркнула that Russia possesses significant capabilities in this area, but effective cooperation requires willingness from both sides. She noted that Moscow stands ready to respond to any such request, including in areas such as information security, combating cyber fraud, and engagement on international platforms. The spokesperson added that Russia is prepared not only to provide expert assessments but also to develop practical cooperation mechanisms, supported by specialized departments within the Foreign Ministry and other relevant agencies.

—

As Armenia prepares for its parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, 2026, civil society organizations are once again expected to play an important role in the public sphere. Elections are not only moments of political competition. They also test the quality of institutions, the credibility of public information, and the strength of oversight mechanisms. The Central Electoral Commission has already opened the 2026 election framework online, including procedures for accrediting observer organizations and media representatives, which underlines how early the institutional preparations have begun.[1]

A Watchdog Role Within an Established Legal Framework

Artur Sakunts, head of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor Office, views civil society’s role during elections as closely connected to its broader democratic function. In his words, “Civil society’s role during elections is to observe, assess, and contribute to transparency within the framework of the law.” This framing place civil society within the institutional environment rather than outside it. Its role is not to replace formal institutions, but to observe how electoral rules are implemented, to follow developments attentively, and to raise concerns through professional and lawful channels when necessary. In this sense, the watchdog function is primarily about oversight and procedural accountability within the existing legal structure. At the same time, Mr. Sakunts underlines that election observation should not be limited to procedural compliance alone. In his view, it also requires attention to the broader democratic content of the electoral process, including whether political actors participating in elections uphold democratic values in practice. This aspect becomes particularly important in the context of hybrid threats, where the quality of democratic competition may be shaped not only by formal procedures, but also by the extent to which public discourse and political conduct remain consistent with democratic principles.

Observation Is Professional Practice

Election observation in Armenia is conducted by licensed organizations operating with trained teams and established methodologies. It is structured work that requires preparation, coordination, and adherence to clearly defined standards. Zara Hovhannisyan, co-founder of New Justice Culture NGO and board member of Transparency International Armenia, emphasizes this professional dimension. “Professional election observation requires trained teams, licensing, and consistent methodology,” she notes. Public materials from the Central Electoral Commission indicate that observer accreditation procedures are underway, underscoring the institutional character of the process. At the same time, Ms. Hovhannisyan observes that the number of organizations engaged in systematic election monitoring remains limited. Ensuring broad geographic coverage requires considerable resources, making organizational capacity an important consideration.

Both interviewees also refer to concerns about individuals or groups participating in the election environment whose accreditation status or methodological standards may not always be clear. Such situations can create confusion and potentially affect public perceptions of monitoring efforts. Maintaining professional standards therefore contributes not only to the quality of observation itself, but also to the broader credibility of the process.

The Information Environment

Elections are shaped not only by procedures, but also by the information environment surrounding them. Media coverage, political messaging, and digital platforms influence how voters interpret events. The interviewees point to misinformation and polarized media dynamics as recurring features of election periods. Armenia is not unique in this regard. Regional experience shows that election campaigns often coincide with heightened narrative competition and intensified public debate. International observation of Armenia’s 2021 parliamentary elections noted significant political polarization in the campaign environment, while also describing the overall process as competitive and generally well administered.[2] For this reason, civil society engagement extends beyond polling station observation. It also involves public communication, clarification of procedures, and contributions to fact-based discussion. This broader emphasis is reflected in international cooperation frameworks as well. For example, the Council of Europe’s Action Plan for Armenia for 2023–2026 includes measures aimed at strengthening media literacy and countering disinformation in the pre-election context.[3]

Cooperation and Institutional Development

Both experts note that cooperation between civil society organizations and state institutions has developed in several areas, including electoral legislation, anti-corruption strategies, police-related policy frameworks, and human rights initiatives. This cooperation, however, tends to be issue-specific rather than part of a comprehensive coordination mechanism. Such a pattern is not uncommon in transitional democratic contexts, where interaction between public institutions and civil society often evolves gradually through targeted engagement rather than permanent institutionalized partnership. Regional examples such as Moldova and Romania were mentioned as cases where sustained professional monitoring practices and capacity-building initiatives have contributed to strengthening electoral oversight. These experiences may offer methodological insights relevant to Armenia’s ongoing institutional development.

Armenia’s electoral framework provides formal procedures for oversight and participation, and civil society operates within this established legal structure. The effectiveness of oversight mechanisms therefore depends not only on legislation, but also on the practical quality of cooperation and professional practice over time.

Funding, Capacity, and Continuity

Like many civil society sectors in the region, Armenian NGOs operate within financial and organizational constraints. Election monitoring requires trained personnel, logistical coordination, and continuity across electoral cycles. Funding thus becomes a structural factor shaping what is feasible. International donors have historically played an important role in supporting civil society initiatives in Armenia. At the same time, changes in funding priorities and reductions in certain forms of support have introduced a degree of unpredictability. State grant mechanisms also exist, though they remain limited relative to the scope of societal issues addressed by civil society actors. Sustaining professional expertise and institutional memory beyond a single election cycle is therefore a central challenge. In this respect, continuity and organizational stability matter as much as financial resources.

Public Trust Across a Diverse Sector

The interviews also highlight that public perception of civil society is not uniform. Levels of trust may vary depending on the thematic focus of individual organizations. Groups engaged in election monitoring and transparency-related activities often operate within clearly defined legal frameworks, which may facilitate broader public recognition of their role. Organizations addressing issues that intersect with social, cultural, religious, minority, or other sensitive areas may encounter more complex public reactions. These variations do not necessarily reflect questions of institutional legitimacy; rather, they illustrate how societal context shapes the reception of civic engagement. Civil society in Armenia therefore represents a diverse field of actors rather than a single unified entity. Differences in visibility, public acceptance, and thematic focus are part of that diversity.

Beyond Observation

Taken together, these interviews suggest that civil society remains an integral part of Armenia’s electoral environment. Its contribution includes observation, monitoring, communication, and participation in policy dialogue. At the same time, its role is shaped by practical realities: organizational capacity, funding conditions, coordination practices, and the broader information environment. Civil society does not determine electoral outcomes, but it contributes to transparency, public confidence, and institutional accountability within the existing legal framework. In Armenia, as in many democratic systems undergoing institutional development, elections are influenced not only by formal procedures, but also by the broader relationship between institutions, professional oversight actors, and public trust. Civil society’s engagement forms part of that wider ecosystem.

This article draws on interviews conducted with Armenian civil society representatives in March 2026.

About author: Siranush Grigoryan is a PhD candidate in International Law.

[1] Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia (CEC). Parliamentary Elections 2026 – Official Information Portal.

[2] OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). International Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 20 June 2021 – Final Report.

[3] Council of Europe. Action Plan for Armenia 2023–2026.

On April 2, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk warned that Armenia’s EU-oriented policies and actions against Russian businesses may force Moscow to reconsider economic ties, citing risks to investments, transit routes, and nuclear cooperation.

Overchuk stated in an interview with TASS that Armenia has approached a threshold at which Russia may be forced to revise its economic ties with the country. He noted that although Armenian officials consistently affirm their friendship with Russia and commitment to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) during bilateral and multilateral meetings, “comparing words with actions” suggests otherwise. According to him, Moscow maintains open and respectful dialogue, yet observes discrepancies between Yerevan’s statements and its policies.

Overchuk emphasized that despite assurances from Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, that Russian businesses face no risks in the country, developments indicate the opposite. He recalled that during discussions last summer, Pashinyan directly denied any threats to Russian investors, but subsequent actions have raised concerns. “We see that we are being told one thing, while in reality, something completely different is happening,” Overchuk stated, pointing to alleged violations of property rights involving a Russian businessman in the electricity sector and pressure on a Russian state-owned company to sell its railway concession.

He further underlined that Moscow is aware of both external and internal forces in Armenia seeking to reduce cooperation with Russia. Referring to Armenia’s adoption of a declarative law expressing its aspiration to join the European Union and efforts to align with EU standards, Overchuk argued that recent actions against Russian economic interests should be viewed within this broader political context.

Addressing regional infrastructure, Overchuk stated that the United States is interested in establishing a transport corridor through Armenia—referred to as the “Trump Route”—to facilitate the export of critical minerals from Central Asia and to strengthen oversight of Iran’s northern border. He added that various regional actors attach different strategic importance to the route, including Azerbaijan’s interest in reconnecting its territory and expanding access to Turkey.

Overchuk also drew attention to developments surrounding the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, stressing that Russia is closely monitoring decisions regarding its extension and Armenia’s broader nuclear energy policy. He remarked that explanations provided by Armenian authorities regarding dissatisfaction with an electricity company’s services remain an internal matter, yet emphasized that “property rights are primary” and that state seizures undermine investor confidence. According to him, such precedents increase perceived risks, reduce asset values, and encourage short-term profit strategies among investors.

Discussing regional transport cooperation, Overchuk stated that Armenia halted engagement with Russia on unblocking routes after previously agreeing in 2023 on principles such as sovereignty and reciprocity with Azerbaijan. He argued that this shift has exposed Armenia to “new, very serious threats” that did not previously exist. At the same time, he stressed that both Moscow and Yerevan share an interest in reopening transport links, particularly through the Meghri route, which could enhance connectivity with Iran, Turkey, and other EAEU markets.

Overchuk claimed that Armenia is being prepared for EU membership, which Russia considers a hostile bloc, warning that such a course would entail significant long-term consequences. He linked this trajectory to decisions regarding railway concessions and broader economic policy, asserting that these moves align with Yerevan’s declared rapprochement with the EU.

He also criticized plans for Western data center construction in Armenia, arguing that such projects generate minimal employment and complicate tax collection, while contributing to rising electricity prices that would affect both households and businesses.

Turning to the regional balance, Overchuk stated that the agreement on the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” has disrupted longstanding stability in the South Caucasus. He referenced the historical framework established after the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, noting that recent developments have altered established geopolitical dynamics. According to him, Russia’s participation in trilateral negotiations had previously ensured a balance of interests among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other regional actors.

He noted that Armenia’s decision to proceed with the project without Russia, alongside Turkey’s ongoing railway construction toward Nakhichevan, has reduced clarity regarding the future of the Meghri section and increased pressure on Armenia. Overchuk described the exclusion of Russia from negotiations as “a big mistake.”

According to Overchuk, Armenia agreed to retain only 26% of transit revenues under the new route, effectively ceding 74%, which he characterized as a sovereign but potentially disadvantageous decision. He argued that continued participation in the trilateral framework could have ensured full ownership and near-completion of the project under more favorable terms.

He also questioned the long-term viability of the corridor, citing reliance on cargo transported across the Caspian Sea, which is shrinking due to climate change. This, he stated, introduces significant investment risks and may necessitate reliance on Russian rail infrastructure or costly dredging operations. “This is not fantasy,” Overchuk emphasized, referencing the rapid environmental decline of the Aral Sea as a precedent.

Additionally, Overchuk pointed out that Turkey is already constructing a direct railway connection to Azerbaijan, regardless of Armenia’s involvement, thereby limiting Yerevan’s ability to influence future cargo flows. He warned that if Russia’s economic interests in Armenia diminish, transit through Armenian territory may also decline, further restricting the country’s negotiating leverage.

Addressing nuclear energy cooperation, Overchuk stated that Russia’s state corporation Rosatom could extend the operation of Armenia’s nuclear power plant until 2036, provided certain conditions are met. However, he criticized Armenia’s preference for European contractors, arguing that they lack experience in seismically active regions and fail to coordinate adequately with the plant’s original designers. He stressed that Rosatom’s involvement must constitute at least 70% of the work to ensure safety guarantees.

Overchuk highlighted Russia’s global leadership in nuclear construction, noting its extensive portfolio of projects worldwide. He added that while Armenia has shown interest in small modular reactors, only Russian technology currently offers viable solutions, a fact well understood by Armenian specialists.

He further warned that discussions about limiting the presence of Russian companies in Armenia could prompt reciprocal considerations regarding Armenian businesses operating in Russia. Emphasizing that economic relations are a “two-way street,” he suggested that restrictions on one side would inevitably affect the other.

Overchuk also expressed skepticism about Armenia’s prospects in EU markets, particularly for agricultural and beverage exports, urging businesses to realistically assess these opportunities. He noted that expectations of replacing EAEU trade with EU trade may not align with actual European market access.

Finally, Overchuk stated that discussions about Armenia’s EU integration have already had tangible economic consequences. He noted that mutual trade between Russia and Armenia declined from $11.5 billion in 2024 to approximately $6.4 billion in 2025, attributing a $5.1 billion loss to uncertainty surrounding Yerevan’s geopolitical orientation. “How do you think Russian entrepreneurs will react,” he asked, “if Russian businesses are forced out of Armenia while Armenian companies continue operating in Russia?”

—

On April 2, Khalil Shirgolami, the Iranian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Armenia, noted that Tehran does not wish to preemptively take a position or draw conclusions regarding the Trump Route (TRIPP). 

Shirgolami emphasized that Iran has previously expressed support for Armenia developing its potential as a transit route, including discussions on lifting the blockade, the North-South corridor, and connecting the Black Sea with the Persian Gulf. At the same time, he noted that Iran is attentive to ensuring these developments do not create security concerns.

The ambassador also referenced US intentions toward Iran, mentioning statements by former President Donald Trump and Pentagon Secretary Pete Hegseth about returning Iran “to the Stone Age.” He contrasted this with Persian history, highlighting that “when many were still living in caves, Persia, led by King Cyrus the Great, published the first declaration of human rights.”

—