June 23, 2026

Telecom Armenia and Azertelecom have signed agreements to route internet traffic through each other’s territories. According to RFE/RL, the agreement would allow Azerbaijan to provide its exclave Nakhchivan with internet connectivity using Armenian infrastructure.

The agreements were announced on Monday afternoon, with both companies issuing statements saying that the agreement provides for the transmission and transit of internet through their respective countries on a commercial basis.

In nearly identical statements, Telecom Armenia and Azertelecom said that it was expanding the number and geography of countries supplying international internet traffic, ‘ensuring transit to Azerbaijan through its own infrastructure’.

According to RFE/RL, Telecom Armenia has not specified how much it will receive in exchange for Azertelecom using its infrastructure. Additionally, the outlet cited the company’s deputy director Aram Barseghyan as saying that Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) must first greenlight the agreement before its implementation.

Barseghyan also clarified that connections would be made in Kornidzor and Yeraskh. Kornidzor is located in eastern Armenia, near the border with Azerbaijan and the Lachin region. Yeraskh is located in western Armenia, near the border with Turkey and Nakhchivan. He also added that the Azerbaijani side will not connect to Armenia’s network or data, but would only be able to use its cables with a speed of 100 gigabits per second.

‘The cable does not enter Armenia, but at the border, as it is with Georgia, Turkey, and Iran’, Barseghyan told RFE/RL. ‘Everyone brings their own cable, a cable is laid right on the border, and it goes from point A to point B’.

‘There is no internet, it’s just a transit channel through which they use their internet […] We don’t sell them any Armenian goods, we don’t sell them anything from Armenia, we give them the opportunity through our channel, as it were, to get from point A to point B, so that they can go from Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan and vice versa’, Barseghyan added, noting it was a ‘very big strategic advantage’.

Barseghyan further noted that the telecommunications agreement was made ‘according to TRIPP logic’, but that it was not directly part of the project itself.

TRIPP, or the Trump Route, is a major infrastructure project agreed upon by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the US that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. The project entails major infrastructure work, including power lines and gas pipelines.

A digital security expert who wished to remain anonymous explained to OC Media that internet service providers run data through international routes — or other countries.

‘If someone’s internet traffic runs through your ISP, you can indeed spy on it. Not the “I read your Signal messages’ kind, but more of the “I know how much you use Facebook” kind’, they explained.

The expert noted, however, that Armenia already routes its traffic through other countries, as ‘nobody exists in a vacuum’.

‘These changes are mostly benign, but sometimes really bad. Ukraine routed a lot of its traffic via Russia 10 years ago’, they added.

Amidst online debate on what security ramifications such an agreement could have for either country, geopolitical analyst Dionis Cenușa wrote on X that ‘the more linkages are established, the less likely conflicts will emerge between interconnected sides’.

‘That’s the formula that made the EU a peaceful project and protected Europe from wars among the nations that formed the bloc’, he wrote.

‘Despite this step’s significance for normalisation, Armenia has to understand that Azerbaijan remains a regime with autocratic tendencies’, he continued, adding that Armenia was surrounded by other states ‘with autocratic tendencies’.

‘Indeed, establishing lasting peace is crucial for the region’s stability and prosperity, but Armenia requires diversification and interconnectedness’, Cenușa continued.

June 22, 2026

Armenia’s Election Results Telling for Azerbaijan Peace Process

Executive Summary:

• The results of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections led to a win for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s peace-oriented and pro-Western agenda, with nearly half of the voters rejecting Russia-backed opposition forces advocating renewed alignment with Moscow.
• Post-election diplomacy signals continued momentum in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s unprecedented congratulation to Pashinyan, renewed Armenia–Azerbaijan talks in Dilijan, and progress on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
• The central obstacle in the peace process remains Armenia’s constitutional preamble, which Azerbaijan says must be revised before a peace treaty is signed, which requires a constitutional referendum from the Armenian people.

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Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections held implications not only for domestic governance concerns. They represented a geopolitical choice between anchoring the country’s future in peace with Azerbaijan, normalization with Türkiye, and integration with Western institutions, and revitalizing the damaged alliance with Russia and reverting to the irredentist posture that had left Armenia isolated (see EDM, June 5). Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract secured 49.81 percent of the national vote, with the Strong Armenia Alliance of Samvel Karapetyan at 23.29 percent and Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance at 9.94 percent (CivilNet, June 9). Voter turnout reached 58.94 percent—the highest since 2017—reflecting the depth of the civilizational stakes the electorate understood to be on the ballot. Those Russia-supported groups who ran against the peace agenda and Armenia’s pro-Western drift were decisively rejected.

The international reaction to the result has itself been geopolitically revealing. U.S. President Donald Trump congratulated Pashinyan on what he called a “decisive victory,” expressing pride in having endorsed him for re-election and predicting Armenia would “attain levels of greatness and success beyond everyone’s wildest expectations” (Armenpress, June 11). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a congratulatory message expressing “full confidence” that Pashinyan’s “strategic vision for establishing long-term peace and stability in the region will be completed” (News.am, June 11). This is the first time Ankara had ever congratulated Pashinyan on an election victory, signaling Türkiye’s genuine investment in a peace process whose conclusion would enable Armenian–Turkish normalization (see EDM, May 22; Armenia News-Pravda, June 11).

Russia’s posture was starkly different. Moscow recalled Russian Ambassador to Armenia Sergei Kopyrkin to Moscow on May 30 in a pre-election pressure move (Armenpress, May 30). Russia also deployed trade bans, energy threats, and an artificial intelligence-powered disinformation campaign against Armenia leading up to the elections (see EDM, June 5). Moscow was reduced, after the election results, to a quiet climb-down. Kopyrkin returned to Yerevan and resumed duties in time to host a Russia Day reception, with no statement acknowledging the pressure campaign’s failure (Armenpress, June 10). Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov then declared Armenia’s choice between European Union and Eurasian Economic Union membership an “urgent” matter requiring swift resolution (TASS, June 10). This framing reflects Moscow’s shift from trying to prevent Pashinyan’s re-election to managing the deteriorating relationship that will follow.

The most concrete signal that the peace process with Azerbaijan will continue after the elections came on June 14, just one week after the election. A working meeting was held in Dilijan, Armenia, between Hikmet Hajiyev, assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, and Armen Grigoryan, secretary of the Security Council of Armenia (Azertag, June 14). The sides discussed the full range of the peace agenda, underscored the importance of sustained bilateral dialogue, and exchanged views on confidence-building measures between civil societies. They agreed that their next meeting would take place in Azerbaijan (APA, June 14). This signals reciprocal institutional momentum rather than a one-off encounter. The Dilijan meeting is significant not for what was announced but for when it happened. Within days of a contentious election, with the opposition still contesting results, Baku and Yerevan resumed direct senior-level contact.

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) adds a further dimension of urgency to the post-election calendar. Armenia’s Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Minister Davit Khudatyan stated on June 12 that preparatory work on the ground is in its final phase. Construction is expected to begin in the fall or winter of 2026 (News.am, June 12). This is consistent with Pashinyan’s own April statement that on-the-ground implementation would begin in 2026, with power transmission lines likely to be the first infrastructure element commissioned (Armenpress, April 22). The 43-kilometer (27-mile) multimodal route through Armenia’s Syunik Province, connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave and forming the South Caucasus link of the Middle Corridor, is the most operationally consequential element of the peace architecture established in Washington on August 8, 2025. Its construction timeline, now converging on the late-2026 window, creates an independent momentum toward implementation that reinforces the case for resolving the treaty’s remaining political precondition in parallel.

That precondition remains unresolved, and the election did not change the arithmetic. Pashinyan’s 49.81 percent placed him well short of the two-thirds parliamentary supermajority required to initiate constitutional amendments through the legislature. Azerbaijan has maintained that, before the peace process is finalized, Armenia needs to revise its constitution to remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence and to its language on the “reunification” of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (see EDM, June 25, 2024, August 12, 2025). Any revision to the preamble of Armenia’s constitution must proceed through a standalone popular referendum. Azerbaijan’s position on this is consistent and publicly stated. As Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev told journalists at the Munich Security Conference in February, “Once the amendment to Armenia’s constitution is made, we can sign the peace agreement the very next day” (Anadolu Ajansı, February 13). Baku’s insistence reflects a specific legal reality. A treaty’s supremacy clause does not erase the foundational constitutional identity of the state that ratifies it. Armenia’s counterargument—that Article 12 of the drafted agreement establishes treaty supremacy over domestic law—has not persuaded Baku.

The referendum will not be simple. A successful vote requires a majority of ballots cast and participation by at least 25 percent of all registered voters. The pro-Russian parliamentary opposition—Strong Armenia Alliance and Armenia Alliance, together commanding roughly 33 percent of the electorate—diaspora groups, and some other political groups campaign internally against this initiative, framing the constitutional concession as the erasure of national identity. A protracted peace process is an extended window for spoilers. The longer the formal treaty remains unsigned, the more the opposition blocs can be instrumentalized from outside to sustain the conflict’s residual political utility. This structural reality makes the case for acceleration. Closing the constitutional question and bringing the treaty to signature before the process’s momentum dissipates denies external spoilers the time they require and confronts the internal opposition with an irreversible fact rather than an ongoing contest.

The June 7 elections have produced a clear directional signal and a set of concrete near-term developments, including the Dilijan meeting, the TRIPP construction timeline, and the international realignment visible in Erdoğan’s congratulatory message. Together, these suggest the peace process will continue to advance at the working level. They have not, however, resolved the constitutional bottleneck that prevents working-level normalization from progressing to a formally signed peace treaty. The Dilijan agreement to hold the next meeting in Baku confirms that the channel remains open and the agenda active. The mandate Pashinyan received on June 7 is real and democratically legitimate. Whether he can translate it into the constitutional change that unlocks the treaty is the question on which the transformation of the South Caucasus and the durability of what Azerbaijan has achieved over a decade of strategic investment ultimately depend.

June 23 , 2026

By Fuad Abdullayev

The South Caucasus is currently undergoing one of the most significant and forward-looking periods in its modern history. The complete restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty has brought an end to a long-standing conflict that claimed the lives of thousands of people and has created a new geopolitical reality in the region. Today, both at the regional and global levels, the primary objective is to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace based on the principles of international law. However, international practice has repeatedly demonstrated that peace is measured not only by agreements signed at the negotiating table and by formal political statements, but also by the domestic policies of states and the sincere contribution of international actors to this process. After the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan proposed five peace principles grounded in international law, to the Armenian side. Following, it supplied oil products to help meet Armenia’s energy needs and lifted restrictions on the transit of goods to Armenia through its territory.

Unfortunately, despite Azerbaijan’s consistent efforts and initiatives aimed at achieving a lasting and sustainable peace, attempts remain in Armenia and among some of its external patrons to preserve the harmful illusions of the past, artificially sustain the remnants of the dissolved separatist regime, and reorganize them under the guise of various civil society organizations. Such activities undoubtedly inflict direct and significant damage on the process of normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Despite repeated statements by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on the end of the so-called “Karabakh movement” and the acceptance of new political realities, as well as Yerevan’s declared commitment to the swift signing of a final peace agreement, the continuing gap between official rhetoric and domestic political reality is cause for serious concern. A closer examination of behind-the-scenes developments and the domestic political agenda reveals that certain radical circles in Armenia are systematically trying to pass on separatist ideas to future generations and to transform the syndrome of defeat into an aggressive form of revanchism. The greatest threat to the post-conflict period stems not from actual military confrontations, but rather from ideological provocations carried out under the guise of civil society organizations and aimed at poisoning public consciousness. Moreover, when state institutions create official conditions for activities that run counter to the cause of peace, it inevitably raises serious questions about the sincerity of the political will behind the declared commitment to normalization and reconciliation.

One of the most significant examples of this situation is the so-called “Shushi University of Technology,” which operates with the authorization of Armenia’s Ministry of Justice. Officially registered as a foundation, the institution has also been granted a license to issue degrees in a number of academic disciplines by Armenia’s Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports. Of particular concern is the fact that, with financial backing from segments of the Armenian diaspora and even from the embassies of certain foreign states, this organization is engaged not only in educational activities but also in systematic propaganda campaigns. One of the most revealing examples of such an activity was an event held in April at Yerevan State University. During the event, a student affiliated with the abovementioned foundation presented a provocative game entitled “The Path of Artsakh” to a youth audience. Projects of this nature are employed as instruments of visual and psychological influence aimed at fostering utopian, aggressive, and revanchist attitudes among younger generations, reinforcing the notion of “lost territories,” and creating a favorable social environment for the emergence of new bloody conflicts in the future. A matter of particular concern is that this project, which undermines the peace process, received support from the Swiss humanitarian foundation “Kaza”.

Revanchist tendencies and propaganda campaigns are not confined to youth-oriented initiatives; they are also promoted under the cover of international events. A striking example was the “Silicon Mountains” summit held on June 3–4 in the Armenian capital, Yerevan. This scientific and practical forum dedicated to innovation and digitalization was held this year under a slogan referencing the monument “We Are Our Mountains,” which for many years served as one of the symbols of the now-dissolved separatist regime. Particularly troubling is the participation of Armenian officials in such an event, despite repeated declarations of a commitment to peace with neighboring countries. If the Armenian authorities are genuinely prepared to leave behind the darkest chapters of conflict once and for all, then why do state representatives take part in events that subtly employ separatist symbolism and, in doing so, confer legitimacy upon it?

The chronology of events further suggests that this is neither a private initiative undertaken by a small group nor a mere coincidence, but rather the activity of a broad, multi-layered, and coordinated network. Notably, one day before the opening of the summit, on June 2, a ceremony unveiling a replica of the “We Are Our Mountains” monument was held in the Russian city of Yessentuki, under the auspices of the Armenian diaspora.

Against the backdrop of these ongoing developments, the most fundamental threat to peace remains the de facto legitimization of radical forces at the state level. It is well known that the Washington Agreements of August 8, 2025, created the conditions necessary for the full and irreversible consolidation of stability in the region. The Armenian state was expected to adopt a firmer stance toward revanchist forces and to terminate the legal activities of such groups. Moreover, representatives of the Armenian authorities did, in fact, make public statements emphasizing the need to neutralize revanchist structures. The reality, however, tells a different story. Armenia’s Ministry of Justice continues to register such organizations, thereby allowing them to operate within a legal framework. It is sufficient to examine the official registration timeline. On April 1, the public organization “Union of Volunteers of Artsakh” was registered, followed by the “Foundation for the Preservation and Restoration of the Artsakh Heritage”, which was registered on April 23. All of these structures represent radical associations oriented not toward the integration of societies but toward sustaining renewed hostility. The registration of such “public organizations” by a state preparing to sign a peace treaty is simply a manifestation of political hypocrisy.

It must also be noted that one of the key elements of a peace process is engagement with youth, with genuine and sustainable peace depending directly on future generations. However, in Armenia’s case, serious grounds for concern remain in this regard as well. Among the officially registered organizations is the public association “Eagles of Artsakh-Commandos,” which is engaged in the practical training of young people in a spirit of radicalism and aggression. Under the guise of a non-governmental organization, this structure openly conducts military-style training for young people, instructing them in combat tactics, sabotage activities, and the handling of firearms. In light of such facts, a legitimate question arises: what purpose is served by the conduct of such paramilitary training among the civilian population in a society that seeks to present itself to the international community as a peaceful state committed to coexistence with its neighbors? In essence, this process creates the effect of a “time bomb” that could, in the future, pose a serious threat both to Azerbaijan and to the security of the entire region. 

This consistent chain of interconnected and clearly anti-Azerbaijani facts leads to a single, inevitable conclusion: the disease of separatism has not yet been fully eradicated either from the public consciousness in Armenia or, more importantly, from the functioning mechanisms of certain state institutions. Against the backdrop of this troubling situation, Azerbaijan’s demand for amendments to the Constitution of Armenia within the framework of the peace process once again demonstrates its vital importance, historical justification, and compliance with international law. The fundamental requirement formally raised by Azerbaijan during negotiations on the peace treaty is neither a political whim nor an attempt to dictate terms. It is a key security guarantee for the region for decades to come.

As long as the Constitution of Armenia contains references to the Declaration of Independence, which includes territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and as long as similar provisions remain in force in other legislative acts based on that document, radical forces will continue to use them as a form of legal shield, thereby legitimizing their activities. For this reason, Azerbaijan justifiably calls for not a formal and temporary document designed merely to buy time, but for a durable and legally unassailable peace. The facts presented clearly demonstrate that there is no alternative to this principled position taken by Azerbaijan.

June 23, 2026

Azerbaijan and Armenia have signed an agreement allowing the mutual transit of international internet traffic, creating a direct telecommunications link between the two countries for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The deal, announced on 17 June by AzerTelecom and Telecom Armenia, is intended to improve route diversity and network resilience in the South Caucasus.

While presented as a commercial telecommunications arrangement, the agreement carries broader regional significance. For decades, Armenia’s access to international internet networks relied primarily on routes through Georgia and Iran due to closed borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The new arrangement establishes a direct digital connection between Armenian and Azerbaijani networks, representing an important step after decades of conflict.

Under the agreement, AzerTelecom will carry internet traffic destined for Armenia through its network, while Telecom Armenia will provide reciprocal transit services for traffic heading to Azerbaijan. The partnership also connects Armenia to Azerbaijan’s wider connectivity projects, including the “Digital Silk Way” initiative, which seeks to strengthen data links between Europe and Asia.

The development follows a gradual process of normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan. Notably, Azerbaijan has repeatedly identified the restoration of transport and communication links as a key component of a future peace settlement. Since the initialling of a peace agreement during a summit in Washington in August 2025, the two sides have taken several important steps, including progress on border delimitation and the easing of certain transit restrictions.

The telecommunications agreement is also significant because it was negotiated by private operators rather than government officials. Industry observers note that commercial infrastructure projects can create long-term economic ties and mutual dependencies that are more difficult to reverse than political declarations.

The deal may also have implications for future regional connectivity initiatives. Attention is increasingly focused on the Black Sea Green Energy Corridor, a major project involving Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary that aims to transmit renewable electricity from the Caspian region to Europe through a submarine cable across the Black Sea. Although Armenia is not currently part of the project, the new internet transit arrangement demonstrates that practical cross-border infrastructure cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is becoming increasingly feasible as relations continue to improve.

Source: commonspace.eu with AzerNEWS.

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June 23, 2026

BYMUFLIH HIDAYAT

Inside the Lydian Amulsar Project Contracts: Engineering a Gold Mine in the Caucasus

Greenfield gold mining in emerging markets rarely follows a straight line. Between geological complexity, community dynamics, financing structures, and the sheer logistical challenge of building industrial infrastructure in remote terrain, the gap between a definitive feasibility study and a producing mine is littered with failed procurement strategies and capital missteps. The Lydian Amulsar project contracts represent one of the most technically ambitious and financially layered attempts to bridge that gap in the modern history of the South Caucasus — and the story of how those contracts were structured, who won them, and what ultimately challenged their execution offers a masterclass in both mining development best practice and its inherent vulnerabilities.

Understanding the Amulsar Deposit’s Physical and Strategic Context

Situated approximately 10 kilometres from the spa resort town of Jermuk and roughly 170 kilometres southeast of Yerevan, the Amulsar gold deposit occupies a geographically and politically loaded position in Armenia’s landscape. It is widely regarded as the largest greenfield gold mining project in the country’s modern history, a distinction that amplified both its commercial appeal and the scrutiny it attracted from communities, environmental groups, and multilateral institutions alike.

The project’s operating entity, Lydian Armenia CJSC, sits beneath an ownership structure that evolved significantly over the project’s turbulent development history. As of January 2024, the Armenian government formalised a 12.5% equity stake in the project, with the remaining 87.5% held by United Gold. Toronto-based Lydian International served as the original parent company that drove the project through its early-stage development and, critically, through the contract award phase that unfolded in early 2017.

Understanding who holds equity in a mining project matters enormously when assessing long-term execution risk. Government co-ownership introduces a layer of political alignment that can accelerate the securing of mining permits and reduce sovereign risk, but it also introduces governance complexity that purely private structures avoid. At Amulsar, this tension between alignment and complexity has been a recurring theme throughout the project’s lifecycle.

The Major Lydian Amulsar Project Contracts: A Technical Breakdown

When Lydian International awarded the primary Amulsar contracts in early 2017, the procurement framework touched every critical operational system from earth movement to gold recovery. The selection of Tier-1 global suppliers was a deliberate bankability signal, communicating to project financiers that the development would be built to international standards.

Contract Category	Awarded To	Scope
Mobile Mining Fleet	Zeppelin International (Caterpillar)	Haul trucks, shovels, loaders, dozers, support equipment
Materials Handling and Crushing	Sandvik Mining and Construction	Crushing plant, screening, 5.6 km overland conveyor
Electrical Systems and Automation	ABB Automation	Substations, distribution grid, motors, process control, E-houses
Gold Recovery Plant	Azmet Technology and Projects	ADR plant design and supply
Worker Accommodations	Renco and Renco Armestate	680-bed camp facility
Contract Mining Services	MOTA-ENGIL Mining Caucasus LLC	Comprehensive industrial engineering (USD 700M, 72 months)

Each of these awards reflected specific technical requirements shaped by the project’s heap-leach processing model and its challenging mountainous terrain. The logic behind each selection deserves closer examination.

The Caterpillar Fleet: Scaling a 35 Million Tonne Per Year Open-Pit Operation

Zeppelin International, acting as the authorised Caterpillar dealer for the region, secured the contract for the complete mobile mining fleet at Amulsar. The equipment package encompasses the full spectrum of open-pit mining machinery: haul trucks, hydraulic shovels, wheel loaders, bulldozers, and ancillary support vehicles.

The production targets built into this contract are substantial:

• Year one mining throughput: 25 million total tonnes
• Steady-state average capacity: 35 million tonnes per year following phased fleet additions
• Equipment delivery schedule: Commencing Q3 2017

The phased approach to fleet commissioning is worth noting from an investment analysis perspective. Rather than deploying the full 35 Mtpa equipment complement from day one, the project was structured to add incremental fleet capacity as production ramped up. This approach reduces upfront capital exposure significantly, as each haul truck in a large open-pit fleet can represent an individual capital commitment of USD 3 to 5 million depending on payload class.

Phased fleet deployment in open-pit mining is a well-established capital efficiency strategy. Tying additional equipment tranches to measurable production milestones rather than upfront procurement orders means capital follows operational performance rather than preceding it.

Sandvik’s Materials Handling System: The 5.6 Kilometre Conveyor Solution

Sandvik Mining and Construction’s contract at Amulsar covers one of the project’s most technically distinctive infrastructure elements. The materials handling scope includes a complete crushing and screening plant alongside a 5.6-kilometre overland conveyor that connects the crushing facility directly to the heap-leach pad.

The crushing circuit architecture follows a conventional two-stage approach:

1. A vibrating feeder delivers run-of-mine ore to a primary jaw crusher for initial size reduction.
2. Three secondary cone crushers provide further comminution before the screening plant classifies the product by particle size.
3. The sized ore is then transported via the overland belt system to the leach pad, supplemented by a storage reclaim system and truck loadout feed configuration.

The practical significance of the overland conveyor is often underappreciated in project summaries. Eliminating truck haulage between the crusher and the leach pad reduces diesel consumption, lowers tyre costs, and cuts CO2 emissions across the mine’s operational life. For a project in a politically sensitive environment where environmental performance was already under scrutiny, this design choice carried both economic and reputational logic.

Furthermore, at 5.6 kilometres, the Amulsar conveyor sits at the longer end of the range for comparable heap-leach gold operations globally, where 2 to 4 kilometre systems are more typical. This length reflects the topographic separation between the processing area and the designated leach pad footprint.

ABB’s Electrical Infrastructure: Why Premanufactured E-Houses Matter

ABB Automation’s scope at Amulsar goes well beyond simple power supply. The contract covers the full electrical nervous system of the processing facility, including:

• High- and medium-voltage substation design and supply
• Complete distribution grid engineering across the plant footprint
• Automation and process control systems using SCADA and distributed control system (DCS) architecture
• Motors and variable frequency drives (VFDs) for process equipment
• Premanufactured electrical rooms, commonly referred to as E-houses

The deployment of premanufactured E-houses is a detail that often receives insufficient attention in project announcements but carries real execution value. E-houses are factory-assembled and pre-tested electrical enclosures that arrive on-site ready for connection. In a remote, mountainous location like Amulsar, where skilled electrical construction labour is scarce and Armenian winter conditions create substantial on-site construction risk, the ability to install a pre-tested electrical assembly rather than construct it in the field can translate into months of schedule compression and meaningful cost savings.

This procurement philosophy, favouring modular and premanufactured systems, has become increasingly standard in remote mining projects globally. Consequently, Amulsar’s adoption of it in 2017 positioned the project at the more sophisticated end of the emerging market development spectrum.

June 23, 2026

rmenia will tighten its gambling regulations for online users, with new bans on “at-risk” individuals and stricter betting limits.

The National Assembly of Armenia, the country’s parliament, voted in favor of the regulations during a second and final reading of a new law that will come into force on January 1 next year.

The development comes shortly after lawmakers approved the launch of a new regulatory framework for gaming operators.

Lawmakers said they hope the new measures will protect citizens from gambling addiction, reported Armenia’s Arka News Agency.

Officials said the size of the online gambling market has increased 35x in the space of just eight years.

A lawmaker said the government believes that between 2017 and 2025, Armenians spent around $20 billion on online betting platforms.

Tax revenues from the sector do not reflect the industry’s size and scale, the government said.

The online gambling industry accounts for just 1% of the total government budget revenues.

New Armenia Gambling Rules: Welfare Recipients Face Ban

The new law will require operators and government agencies to block access to online casinos for all citizens receiving government subsidies.

These include people who receive mortgage payments and education fee support, as well as agricultural loan recipients.

Pensioners who receive no income other than their pensions face similar barriers.

The blocks will also extend to people involved in bankruptcy-related legal proceedings, and individuals with “high debt burdens.”

The law will see all individuals with loan payments exceeding 40% of their annual incomes placed into the latter category.

Residents not included on the list will also need to navigate new regulations as of next year: Individuals’ spending on online bets must not exceed 20% of their annual income.

Armenia’s New Betting Kill Switch

Operators will also face a range of new rules.

All online gambling platforms operating in Armenia, including both domestic and overseas operators, must add and “prominently display” auto-blocking, kill-switch-type buttons in their interfaces.

This “button” will allow users who recognize they have a gambling addiction to “block their account with a single click.”

The kill switch will not only block the user from accessing the platform in question but also cut off their access to all other permit-holding platforms.

The law stipulates that any foreign platforms that fail to comply with the new law will be subject to blanket blocking orders.

“After pressing this button, users will not be able to gamble on online casinos for five years, without the possibility of early reinstatement,” said lawmaker Hayk Sargsyan, one of the bill’s chief architects.

“When the five-year period ends, the block will automatically extend for another five years unless the individual applies to lift the restriction five days before it expires.”

Armenia legalized and started regulating land-based casinos in 2004. In 2013, the government restricted casino operators to four official gambling zones.

Last year, the government launched a blanket 10% turnover tax on online and land-based casino operators. The tax also applies to lotteries and sports betting platforms.

In nearby Russia, lawmakers last week approved a measure to fast-track blocking orders on online casino websites.

June 23, 2026

June 23, 2026

Islam Times – The high spirit of resistance of the Iranian people is considered as the most important strengths during the US and Israeli war of aggression imposed against Iran on February 28.The US and Israeli war of aggression against Iran had vast media coverage in various countries of the region, especially the Republic of Armenia.

To learn more about the details, our correspondent conducted an interview with Tsovinar Barkhudaryan a prominent Armenian journalist in Armenia’s TV “Channel 5” and a broadcaster from Artsakh.

She shed light on the views of Armenian public opinion and media outlets on the war of aggression imposed by the United States and Israel against Iran, its consequences, and the future of the negotiation process.

Let’s review the interview in questions and answers:

Q: How was Iran-US war viewed in Armenia? What were the consequences of the war that people of this country was most concerned about?

A: In response to this question, I should say that Armenian people were very concerned about Iran during the war and were extremely worried about what was happening to the Iranian people.

Now that the path to negotiations and cessation of conflicts has been paved, Armenian people feel satisfied and happy with this situation and hope that America will not enter into a wider war against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The people of Armenia feel secure and boast in having a powerful neighbor like Iran, and for that, they follow developments of war in Iran with sensitivity.

Q: Was there concerned about the spread of war to the Caucasus region?

A: Regarding the spread of war to the Caucasus region, I should say that there were serious concerns that the scope of the conflict would extend to the South Caucasus. The economic consequences of the war were not limited to Iran, but were also felt by countries in the region. In addition to the economic issues, there were also concerns about the security and military consequences of spread of war.

Q: How did Armenian media outlets cover the war?

A: From the first days of the war, Armenia’s Channel 5 continuously covered news related to Iran and the war, and there was almost no day when this topic was not raised in our news segments and analytical programs. News of this war was covered under the title “The War Imposed by the US and Israel Against Iran,” and numerous expert programs were held to examine its various aspects.

Regarding some of the problems faced by Armenia’s media outlets in accessing Iranian news, I should say that one of the important issues during the war was the difficulty of accessing direct narratives from inside Iran, especially during times when there were internet restrictions, it became difficult for foreign media to quickly receive official Iranian news and narratives.

If more cooperation is formed between Iranian and Armenian media and the possibility of receiving first-hand news is provided, the quality of media coverage will also increase.

Lashing out at the dominance of the Western media narrative over the global public opinion, I should say that, today, we live in the Age of media and the Internet, but unfortunately the true image of Iran is not conveyed to the regional and global public opinion as it should be.

Many people in different countries are influenced by the narrative of Western media, and for that, Iranian media needs to work harder than ever to convey their direct and true narrative to global audiences.

Q: How was the US attack on Iran evaluated in the public opinion of the Republic of Armenia?

A: The Armenian people do not have a positive view of war and military aggression due to their historical experiences.

We have also had the experience of war and the imposition of conflict, and for that, it is natural that we cannot have a positive view of military action against another country.

Q: Does the signing of a 14-point memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the United States mark the end of crisis or merely a temporary halt to the war?

A: I am not a political analyst, but my media experience shows that mere written agreements do not necessarily guarantee the implementation of commitments.

What caught my attention most during my trip to Iran was the spirit of resistance of the Iranian people. I heard many times from Iranians that they are willing to pay any price for their country, and this spirit of resistance is Iran’s most important strength.

During my visit to Iran, I also toured southern Iran and the Strait of Hormuz region and observed that Iran has ample capacities and capabilities. For that, I believe that Iran is a country that has considerable potential and capabilities.

Any concluding remarks.

This trip was a valuable opportunity to see Iran in-person and see the realities of this country with my own eyes.

I return to Armenia with very positive feelings and I can honestly say that I have fallen in love with Iran.

I hope that people of Iran will never again experience the pain and suffering of war and that lasting peace and tranquility will prevail in this country forever.

https://www.islamtimes.com/en/interview/1287718/armenian-journalist-spirit-of-resistance-iran-most-important-strengths-during-war