Sports: Sunderland’s Armenian Sensation Faces Summer Battle To Stay: Can Le B

Vital Football
May 16 2026

Sunderland’s Armenian Sensation Faces Summer Battle To Stay: Can Le Bris Build A Pathway For Their Brightest Gem?

Rohit Sarkar

Transfer news: Sunderland have opened contract talks with young forward Finn Geragusian amid transfer interest from Rangers and several EFL clubs, as reported by the Sunderland Echo. This transfer news centres on an 18-year-old attacker who has become one of the most-watched teenagers in English football. The Country Durham-born striker, who can also operate from the right flank, is out of contract this summer after completing a two-year scholarship deal.

Sunderland Transfer News: Black Cats Open Contract Talks With Finn Geragusian As Rangers Interested

Across his last two academy campaigns combined, Geragusian delivered 35 goal contributions in 60 appearances, a figure that attracted scouts from far beyond the north east. Rangers and Nottingham Forest have both registered interest, while clubs from the EFL and across Europe monitor his contractual situation.

Per Daily Mail journalist Craig Hope, Rangers could potentially secure his signature for a cross-border compensation figure of around £173,000, making this one of the shrewdest bits of summer business available anywhere. Sunderland, however, have made their intentions absolutely clear that they want to keep the forward and have now formally moved to secure a new deal. A thigh injury ruled Geragusian out of the Premier League Cup final defeat to Burnley late in the season, a frustrating end to an otherwise productive campaign.

Can Régis Le Bris genuinely offer Finn Geragusian a credible first-team future at Sunderland

The honest answer sits somewhere between yes and probably not yet, and that uncertainty is exactly what makes the situation so interesting. Le Bris has turned Sunderland into genuine Premier League overperformers, picking up far more points than their expected total through disciplined defensive structure, set-piece efficiency, and intelligent transitions.

His system rewards forwards who make intelligent runs in behind defensive lines and who press with positional discipline rather than blind aggression, a style that perfectly suits a tall, technical attacker like Geragusian. The manager has shown throughout his time at the Stadium of Light that he trusts young players when they earn it; he invited Geragusian to train with the first team on multiple occasions and rated him highly enough to include him on the bench in an FA Cup tie.

However, with the squad bolstered significantly for Premier League football, regular minutes for an 18-year-old who has yet to make his senior debut are still incredibly tough to promise. Geragusian’s biggest hurdle right now is a complete lack of first-team experience, a gap Rangers, ironically, might close faster through consistent game time.

Sunderland’s strongest argument is that Le Bris develops players rather than discards them, and the Premier League stage itself would accelerate Geragusian’s growth far beyond what Glasgow offers long-term. The Black Cats should commit to a structured loan pathway for 2026/27 alongside a new deal; that approach is what will likely win this transfer battle.

Sunderland transfer news will continue to define their summer as Le Bris builds for 2026/27 and beyond.


Putin loses old ally to Trump’s new trade corridor

The Telegraph, UK
May 17 2026

Armenia’s growing strategic importance is helping it move away from Russia’s grip and deepen its ties with the West

What Emmanuel Macron lacked in talent, he made up for in enthusiasm.

As Armenia’s celebrated jazz pianist Vahagn Hayrapetyan struggled gamely to keep up with his offbeat tempo, the French president – eyebrows furrowed soulfully – warbled Charles Aznavour’s La Bohème into the microphone.

Mr Macron’s performance may have resembled Cacophonix, the tone-deaf bard from the Astérix comics, more than the “French Sinatra”, but if Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s prime minister, was grimacing inwardly as he accompanied his guest on the drums, he was not about to complain.

Seeking re-election next month after a campaign marred by alleged Russian interference, the pro-Western Mr Pashinyan was willing to endure musical pain for political gain.

The French president had come to Yerevan to offer more than karaoke diplomacy. Heading a delegation of European leaders, Mr Macron was staging a show of support for a prime minister determined to pull Armenia out of Moscow’s orbit and deepen ties with the West.

For Europe, the rewards could be considerable. As Russia’s war in Ukraine drains Moscow’s power and prestige, Western governments increasingly see the South Caucasus as a strategic trade, energy and critical-minerals corridor bypassing Russia and Iran.

Nor is it only Europe taking an interest. To Moscow’s growing alarm, Donald Trump has thrown his weight behind a proposed transport route – one that would inevitably bear his name – along Armenia’s southern border with Iran.

The so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (Tripp) would provide the missing link connecting resource-rich Central Asia with Turkey and Europe, weakening Russia’s grip over east-west trade while boosting European access to energy and critical minerals.

The region’s growing strategic importance – heightened further by disruption from the Iran war – helps explain why 48 presidents and prime ministers, including Sir Keir Starmer, descended on Yerevan earlier this month for a three-day series of European summits that also gave Mr Pashinyan a timely political boost.

The jamboree highlighted how Armenia – long treated as a geopolitical backwater – now sits at the centre of a growing contest for influence.

Black limousines roared through Yerevan under police escort. Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, turned heads with an early-morning jog through the capital. But no leader campaigned harder for Armenian hearts than Mr Macron, who delivered speeches, sat on panels, gave press conferences and ultimately won over much of the public with his crooning.

For three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia treated the South Caucasus as its backyard, with Armenia among its most loyal regional allies.

But the Ukraine war has weakened the foundations of Russian dominance across the former Soviet space. Many Armenians concluded the Kremlin had abandoned them when it failed to prevent Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, its former enclave, in 2023. Armenia has since become an unlikely front line in a growing geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West.

Moscow, however, has no intention of surrendering its influence quietly. As Armenians prepare to vote next month, Vladimir Putin has issued pointed warnings to Mr Pashinyan while reminding him of Russia’s enduring grip over much of the Armenian economy.

Armenian officials and Western diplomats also suspect the Kremlin is deploying more covert methods to shape the outcome of a pivotal election.

Russia guards its turf

In a pattern now familiar from elections across eastern Europe, distinguishing fact from fiction in Armenia has become increasingly difficult – something anyone who spends time on the country’s social media quickly discovers.

Post after post, often with links to apparently reputable Western news outlets, luridly details Mr Pashinyan’s invented misdeeds. The prime minister has supposedly trafficked children for sex, bought mansions in Canada and France and plans to flood Christian Armenia with Turkish mosques and French nuclear waste.

European officials also claim that “dark money” from Russia is being used to bribe voters and illegally finance pro-Moscow opposition parties. Last month, the European Union dispatched a “rapid response team” to Armenia to counter cyberattacks and what it described as state-backed disinformation.

Maria Zakharova, the Russian foreign ministry spokesman, denied Moscow was attempting to manipulate the vote.

“Such an approach is foreign to Russia,” she said. “We have always respected and will continue to respect each nation’s sovereign choice.”

Whatever Moscow’s role in the online campaign, the Kremlin’s rhetoric towards Mr Pashinyan has grown increasingly menacing as Armenia deepens ties with the European Union, which it hopes one day to join.

On Monday, Putin warned that any move towards EU membership would mean the immediate loss of tariff-free trade and the preferential gas prices on which much of Armenia’s economy depends.

He also appeared to echo warnings from Russian state television that Armenia’s embrace of the West meant it risked suffering a Ukraine-style fate.

“We are now experiencing everything that is happening in the Ukrainian direction,” Putin said. “But where did it all begin? With Ukraine’s accession or attempts to join the EU.”

Competing corridors

Armenia’s political drift towards the West is troubling enough for Moscow. More alarming still is Mr Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative – enthusiastically backed by Mr Trump – to transform Armenia from a landlocked frontier state into a regional transport hub.

For years the Kremlin has feared the emergence of a “Middle Corridor”, a transport route running through Central Asia and the South Caucasus that would allow Europe to bypass Russia when trading with China and the resource-rich states beyond the Caspian Sea.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, disruption to trade routes and intensifying competition for critical minerals have accelerated interest in alternative overland links between Europe and Asia.

China and the European Union are investing billions in railway construction, port expansion and energy infrastructure across the Middle Corridor.

Yet despite the investment, progress has repeatedly stalled – something European officials blame partly on Moscow’s success in reasserting influence in neighbouring Georgia.

Once regarded as the South Caucasus’s most democratic and pro-Western state, Georgia has drifted steadily back towards Russia under the ruling Georgian Dream party and its billionaire founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili.

One casualty has been the deep-water Black Sea port of Anaklia, envisioned as the principal maritime terminus of the Middle Corridor and the only Georgian port capable of handling the largest container vessels required to make the route commercially viable.

In its latest budget, the Georgian government cut funding for Anaklia by two-thirds, while planned expansions to existing ports have become mired in regulatory disputes and environmental reviews.

Critics accuse the government of deliberately slowing development to preserve Russia’s dominance over regional trade routes.

The resulting bottlenecks are so severe that exporters can often move goods more quickly and cheaply through Russia’s Northern Corridor, centred on the trans-Siberian railway.

Tripp-wire diplomacy

Until Trump’s intervention last year, isolated Armenia looked set to miss out on the Middle Corridor altogether. With its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey sealed for decades after the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted in the late 1980s, Armenia had largely been bypassed in plans for the trade route, which was expected instead to loop around the country’s northern frontier through Georgia.

Everything changed in 2023, when Azerbaijan saw Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force.

After a previous war in 2020, Russia had deployed peacekeepers to protect the territory’s ethnic Armenian population. But as the Ukraine conflict drained Moscow’s military resources, some of its most capable units were redeployed from the South Caucasus to the front.

When Azerbaijan launched its offensive, the remaining peacekeepers were ordered to stand aside – a decision many Armenians interpreted as both a sign of Moscow’s weakness and a deliberate attempt by Putin to punish Mr Pashinyan for his increasingly pro-Western orientation.

The Kremlin appears to have calculated that the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh would trigger Mr Pashinyan’s downfall and return Armenia to Russia’s orbit.

Instead, the Armenian leader weathered the crisis and accelerated his pivot Westward. Now standing for re-election, he is attempting to turn catastrophe into opportunity by normalising relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, despite Ankara’s continuing refusal to recognise formally the Armenian genocide.

That diplomatic breakthrough had long seemed impossible. Azerbaijan had for years demanded a sovereign land corridor through southern Armenia to its exclave of Nakhchivan – a proposal fiercely resisted by Yerevan, which feared losing control of its vital border with Iran.

The situation was complicated further by the 2020 ceasefire agreement, under which responsibility for securing the Armenia-Iran border was handed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) spy agency, an arrangement viewed with deep suspicion in both Yerevan and Washington.

Here, unexpectedly, Mr Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy proved useful.

Seeking to break the deadlock, Washington proposed what diplomats described as a characteristically Trumpian solution: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or Tripp.

Under the proposal, the corridor – a stretch of territory only 27 miles long – would remain sovereign Armenian land. But its development and security would be overseen by a US state-backed company operating under a 99-year lease.

Despite its modest size, Tripp’s strategic implications are significant.

For the EU, which quickly pledged £1.8bn towards the initiative, Tripp offers a major step towards strategic autonomy by creating a southern branch of the Middle Corridor that bypasses both Russia and an increasingly unreliable Georgia.

For Armenia, it represents both an economic lifeline and an exit ramp from Russian domination. As for Mr Trump, he has already earned nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize from both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“Of all the peace agreements that Donald Trump has championed, this is the most promising,” says Thomas de Waal, a South Caucasus expert at Carnegie Europe, a think tank in Brussels.

Even Iran is perhaps more pragmatic than public rhetoric suggests. Although Tehran has publicly threatened military action against the project, officials in Yerevan believe Iran also recognises the commercial advantages of plugging into a lucrative trade route linking it to the Black Sea and Mediterranean.

Only Moscow is angry.

Losing the democratic sheen

Yet there seems little prospect of Russia wooing back its increasingly wayward southern neighbour.

Mr Pashinyan may no longer command the adoration that swept him to power during Armenia’s pro-democracy revolution in 2018. But analysts reckon his ruling Civil Contract Party – buoyed by promises of Western investment and integration – still retains enough support to secure victory next month.

The pro-Moscow opposition, by contrast, remains too divided and discredited to mount a serious challenge, however heavily the Kremlin throws its weight behind it.

“There is little likelihood of the Russian-oriented opposition winning,” says Laurence Broers of Chatham House, an international affairs think-tank.

“Rather than having a genuine horse in the race, Russia is pursuing a disruptive strategy aimed at sowing as much confusion as possible.”

Yet Mr Pashinyan’s democratic credentials are no longer as uncontested as they once were.

Armenia may have overtaken Georgia as the South Caucasus’s most democratic state, but even some allies acknowledge that power has become increasingly concentrated around him.

“It’s a highly personalised government and has been from day one, centred around this single charismatic individual,” says Mr de Waal. “And inevitably that begins to create problems. Increasingly we’re getting a lot of monologues from the prime minister without much dialogue.”

More than a dozen clergymen – including senior bishops – have been detained amid Mr Pashinyan’s escalating confrontation with the influential Armenian Apostolic Church.

Samwel Karapetyan, a prominent opponent of the prime minister, has been placed under house arrest. Police have been accused of using heavy-handed tactics against opposition demonstrations.

Critics accuse the European Union not merely of overlooking such abuses, but of interfering in Armenia’s election more openly than the Russians themselves.

“Russian interference, whatever it may be, pales into insignificance compared to EU interference,” says Robert Amsterdam, an American lawyer representing Mr Karapetyan.

“The EU has come here weeks before an election handing out money and appearing alongside Pashinyan at campaign-style events. Macron did everything other than give him a sainthood.

“The Europeans have sold their principles completely, ignoring the facts on the ground to engage in an all-out fight with Russia.”

Mr Pashinyan’s allies – backed by European diplomats – reject such criticism.

Russia’s influence over Armenian institutions, they argue, runs so deep that strict democratic niceties are a luxury the country cannot currently afford. Moscow has penetrated everything from the church to the security services, they say.

Given the threat of destabilisation, disinformation or even a military coup, the state has no choice but to mount an aggressive response that amounts less to authoritarianism than democratic self-defence.

“We want to be Switzerland,” one government official says. “But we are not Switzerland yet.”

Cairo: Armenia’s Cult-Favourite Marlenka Honey Cake is Coming to Egypt

Cairo Scene, Egypt
May 17 2026

Marlenka’s famed Armenian honey cakes are officially landing in Egypt this summer with classic cakes and bite-sized nuggets.

Raneem Maaly

There’s a new honey cake entering Egypt’s dessert scene this summer, and it already comes with a serious international following. Marlenka, the Czech Republic-based brand known for its layered Armenian honey cakes, is officially launching in Egypt, bringing with it a decades-old family recipe that dates back generations.

Founded in 2003 by Armenian entrepreneur Gevorg Avetisjan, MARLENKA’s story began in the Czech Republic, but its roots trace back to Armenia, where the original honey cake recipe was passed down within the Avetisjan family. Since then, the brand has become known worldwide for its signature handcrafted cakes, made with soft layers of honey dough and a light caramel-like cream filling, finished with cocoa or chopped walnuts.

As part of its Egypt launch, MARLENKA will introduce its classic honey cake alongside the cocoa-flavoured Kokoa Honey Cake, a chocolate-forward take on the original. The brand is also bringing its bite-sized Honey Nuggets, available in classic, lemon, cocoa, coffee, and cinnamon flavours. More details surrounding the launch are expected to be announced through MARLENKA Egypt’s Instagram account in the coming weeks.

https://cairoscene.com/Eats/Armenia-s-Cult-Favourite-Marlenka-Honey-Cake-is-Coming-to-Egypt

Baghdad: President of the Republic Receives Congratulatory Message from Armeni

Iraqi News Agency
May 17 2026

President of the Republic Nizar Amedi received a congratulatory message on Sunday from Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan.

The Presidency of the Republic Media office said in a statement received by INA that the message was delivered by Armenian Ambassador to Iraq, Ruben Soghoyan, on the occasion of Amedi assuming office as President of the Republic.

In his message, the Armenian president extended his sincere congratulations and best wishes for success in carrying out his national responsibilities, affirming Armenia’s commitment to strengthening bilateral relations with Iraq and expanding cooperation across various fields.

The Iraqi president, in turn, conveyed his greetings and appreciation to his Armenian counterpart, stressing the importance of developing bilateral ties in a way that serves the interests of both friendly peoples.

https://ina.iq/en/politics/48787-president-of-the-republic-receives-congratulatory-message-from-armenian-counterpart.html

Could CAAP’s Stronger Q1 And Armenia Deal Quietly Recast Its Long‑Term Capita

Simply Wall.st
may 17 2026

Could CAAP’s Stronger Q1 And Armenia Deal Quietly Recast Its Long‑Term Capital Allocation Story?

May 17, 2026
Simply Wall St
Reviewed by Sasha Jovanovic

In the past week, Corporación América Airports S.A. reported first-quarter 2026 results showing revenue of US$537.62 million, up from US$447.82 million a year earlier, with net income rising to US$77.05 million from US$40.77 million, supported by higher passenger traffic and stronger contributions from Argentina, Armenia, and Brazil.
Beyond the headline growth, the company underscored a 35-year concession extension in Armenia, lower net debt, and internal discussions about introducing a dividend policy, suggesting that its improving cash generation and long-term infrastructure commitments are becoming increasingly central to its investment case.
Next, we’ll examine how this stronger Q1 cash generation and margin improvement could reshape Corporación América Airports’ pre-existing investment narrative.

We’ve uncovered the 13 dividend fortresses yielding 5%+ that don’t just survive market storms, but thrive in them.

Corporación América Airports Investment Narrative Recap

To own Corporación América Airports, I think you need to believe that rising passenger volumes and high‑margin commercial revenue can offset its exposure to volatile, inflation‑prone markets like Argentina. The latest Q1 results showcase stronger cash generation and lower net debt, which supports that thesis in the near term, while the most immediate risk still looks tied to macro and regulatory uncertainty in Argentina rather than anything new in this update.

The 35‑year concession extension in Armenia, paired with the agreed US$425 million investment program, stands out as the announcement most connected to this quarter’s story. It reinforces how CAAP’s catalysts are increasingly tied to long‑duration concessions and infrastructure projects that can compound the benefits of recent margin improvements, but also adds to execution and capital allocation questions that investors will want to keep tracking alongside Argentina’s backdrop.

Yet investors should also be aware that Argentina’s mix of inflation, currency swings, and concession renegotiations could still…

Read the full narrative on Corporación América Airports (it’s free!)

Corporación América Airports’ narrative projects $2.3 billion revenue and $456.7 million earnings by 2029. This requires 5.1% yearly revenue growth and a $209.0 million earnings increase from $247.7 million today.

Uncover how Corporación América Airports’ forecasts yield a $32.00 fair value, a 34% upside to its current price.

Exploring Other Perspectives

CAAP 1-Year Stock Price Chart

Three members of the Simply Wall St Community currently place CAAP’s fair value between US$11.09 and about US$85.95, showing very different expectations. Set against Q1’s stronger margins and lower net debt, that spread underlines how important it is to weigh both the upside from growing traffic and commercial revenues and the ongoing macro and regulatory risks in key markets.

Explore 3 other fair value estimates on Corporación América Airports – why the stock might be worth less than half the current price!

Reach Your Own Conclusion

Don’t just follow the ticker – dig into the data and build a conviction that’s truly your own.

A great starting point for your Corporación América Airports research is our analysis highlighting 5 key rewards that could impact your investment decision.
Our free Corporación América Airports research report provides a comprehensive fundamental analysis summarized in a single visual – the Snowflake – making it easy to evaluate Corporación América Airports’ overall financial health at a glance.

Want Some Alternatives?

Every day counts. These free picks are already gaining attention. See them before the crowd does:

Explore 26 top quantum computing companies leading the revolution in next-gen technology and shaping the future with breakthroughs in quantum algorithms, superconducting qubits, and cutting-edge research.
Invest in the nuclear renaissance through our list of 88 elite nuclear energy infrastructure plays powering the global AI revolution.
Uncover the next big thing with 27 elite penny stocks that balance risk and reward.

This article by Simply Wall St is general in nature. We provide commentary based on historical data and analyst forecasts only using an unbiased methodology and our articles are not intended to be financial advice. It does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, and does not take account of your objectives, or your financial situation. We aim to bring you long-term focused analysis driven by fundamental data. Note that our analysis may not factor in the latest price-sensitive company announcements or qualitative material. Simply Wall St has no position in any stocks mentioned.

Where Armenia Chose Life

Colorado Boulevard, CA
May 16 2026
Guest Opinion

May 28th marks Armenian Independence Day, the anniversary of the birth of the First Republic of Armenia in 1918.

By William Paparian

At its heart stands the Battle of Sardarabad, the decisive victory of May 1918, when a small, exhausted force of Armenian soldiers, volunteers, farmers, and refugees turned back an Ottoman army intent on completing the destruction begun during the Genocide. Without Sardarabad, there might have been no Armenia left to declare independence. As one historian warned, the word “Armenia” could have become merely “an antique geographical term.” Instead, on that battlefield near what is now Nor Armavir, our people chose life.

One hundred years after my grandfather, Nishan Paparian, left Kharpert in Ottoman-occupied Armenia and stepped onto Ellis Island in 1907, my wife, our three sons, and I made the pilgrimage home. It was Father’s Day 2007. Our youngest had just graduated from high school. We had spoken of this journey for years; now it was time to walk the soil our ancestors had been forced to leave.

On the road to Sardarabad, the dry Armenian plateau stretched beneath a brilliant blue sky, the air warm and fragrant with wild thyme and sunbaked earth. Tucked beside the highway in the village of Musaler stood a modest yet powerful monument to the defenders of Musa Dagh — a site absent from most guidebooks. In the summer of 1915, nearly 5,000 Armenians from six Cilician villages at the foot of Musa Dagh refused Ottoman deportation orders. They climbed the mountain, fortified a windswept plateau called Damlayik, and held out for fifty-three days against vastly superior forces. When supplies ran low, they raised giant banners visible from the sea: “Christians in Distress: Rescue!” French warships evacuated more than 4,000 survivors to safety in Egypt. Their stand was immortalized in Franz Werfel’s novel The Forty Days of Musa Dagh. Standing before the Musaler Memorial, the rough stone warm beneath our hands and the wind whispering through the grass, we felt the unbroken thread of defiance stretching from the salty breezes of Cilicia to the plains where we now stood.

From Musa Dagh’s story of desperate survival, we continued to Sardarabad, the place where defiance became victory. In late May 1918, roughly 9,000–10,000 Armenian fighters faced a larger Ottoman force advancing on Yerevan and Etchmiadzin. Under determined commanders, they launched fierce counterattacks. Church bells rang for days, calling peasants, women, and clergy to arms alongside soldiers. After eight days of fighting, the Ottoman advance was halted and pushed back.

As we climbed the broad stone steps toward the towering winged bulls, the rough granite cool beneath our palms and the midday sun warming our shoulders, the memorial bells suddenly began to ring. No ceremony was scheduled. Their deep, resonant peals rolled across the plain like thunder from the past, vibrating through our chests. Tears flowed freely. In that moment, the same bells that once summoned a people to battle seemed to welcome us home.

The museum at Sardarabad remains unmatched in our memory. In its cool interior, scented with aged wood and polished metal, our guide brought the exhibits to life, the weight of rifles carried by farmer-soldiers, grainy photographs of resolute faces, dioramas of the very fields outside. We left understanding that Sardarabad marked the moment Armenians passed from victims to victors, from refugees to republic-builders.

Later, we lit candles in Etchmiadzin’s ancient cathedral and walked the windswept ruins of Zvartnots. Yet it was the twin memorials — Musaler’s quiet fortress and Sardarabad’s soaring bells — that bound our journey together. One spoke of holding on when all seemed lost; the other proclaimed that a people could still rise and claim their future.

On May 28th, as we commemorate the Battle of Sardarabad and the independence it secured, I still carry the sound of those bells. They echo from Kharpert to Ellis Island, from the heights of Musa Dagh to the plains of Sardarabad, from the pain of the Genocide to the pride of nationhood.

They remind every generation that we are not merely inheritors of tragedy, but guardians of triumph, and that the fight begun on that plain in 1918 lives on in us, in our children, and in the sacred chain that binds past, present, and future.

May the bells of Sardarabad ring loud and long for all Armenian Americans. May they stir in us the courage that once saved a mountain, won a republic, and brought a diaspora family home. And may we, like those who came before us, choose life, fiercely, joyfully, and without end.

Happy Armenian Independence Day.
May 28, 2026

Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace May 17: Premier Rejects External Guarantors

Meyka
May 16 2026
By Huzaifa Zahoor

Key Points

Armenia’s premier rejects external guarantors for Azerbaijan peace.

Trump Route security concerns drive opposition calls for international oversight.

Opposition demands Russia, US, China, Iran involvement in peace framework.

Premier’s stance signals Armenia’s commitment to independent diplomatic strategy.


Armenia’s political landscape shifted dramatically as the country’s premier declared that Yerevan does not require external guarantors to secure peace with Azerbaijan. This statement directly contradicts opposition voices calling for involvement from major powers including Russia, the US, China, and Iran. The declaration comes amid escalating concerns about the proposed Trump Route, a critical infrastructure project that could reshape regional connectivity. With search interest surging 1,000% and over 500 searches, the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process has become a focal point for geopolitical analysis and regional security discussions.

Premier’s Stance on Peace Negotiations

Armenia’s premier firmly stated that Yerevan can achieve sustainable peace without relying on external powers as guarantors. This position challenges the opposition’s repeated calls for international oversight and protection mechanisms. The premier’s confidence suggests Armenia believes it can negotiate directly with Azerbaijan on equal footing.

The Trump Route Security Concerns

The proposed Trump Route has emerged as a critical flashpoint in regional security discussions. Narek Karapetyan warned that Iran could target this infrastructure project, citing Armenia’s vulnerable border position. Opposition figures argue this threat justifies the need for international guarantors to protect Armenia’s territorial integrity and economic interests.

Opposition Demands for International Guarantors

Opposition forces in Armenia continue advocating for a ‘guaranteed’ peace framework involving multiple superpowers. They argue that Russia, the US, China, and Iran should collectively ensure Armenia’s security and territorial protection. The premier’s rejection of this approach signals a fundamental disagreement over Armenia’s diplomatic strategy.

Regional Geopolitical Implications

Armenia’s position reflects broader shifts in regional power dynamics and strategic autonomy. By rejecting external guarantors, the premier asserts Armenia’s independence in foreign policy decisions. This stance could reshape how neighboring countries and international actors approach the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution process.

Final Thoughts

Armenia’s premier has taken a bold stance by rejecting external guarantors for peace with Azerbaijan, signaling the country’s commitment to independent diplomacy. The Trump Route security concerns and opposition pressure highlight the complexity of regional negotiations. This development underscores Armenia’s determination to chart its own diplomatic course while managing competing interests from major global powers.

FAQs

Why did Armenia’s premier reject external guarantors?

The premier believes Armenia can achieve sustainable peace with Azerbaijan through direct bilateral negotiations without international oversight or external protection mechanisms.

What is the Trump Route and why does it matter?

The Trump Route is a proposed regional infrastructure project. Opposition figures warn Iran could target it, raising security concerns in Armenia-Azerbaijan peace discussions.

Which countries does the opposition want as guarantors?

Opposition forces call for Russia, the US, China, and Iran to collectively guarantee Armenia’s territorial integrity and security in any peace agreement.

Disclaimer:

The content shared by Meyka AI PTY LTD is solely for research and informational purposes.  Meyka is not a financial advisory service, and the information provided should not be considered investment or trading advice.

Bridges over borders_Why Turkiye and Armenia are closer than ever to reconcili

Blitz Weekly
May 17 2026

Bridges over borders: Why Turkiye and Armenia are closer than ever to reconciliation

Damsana Ranadhiran

Fourteen years ago, a modest but deeply symbolic media bus tour traveled from Istanbul to Yerevan with a mission that many considered unrealistic at the time: encouraging dialogue between Turks and Armenians. Journalists from both countries crossed borders, shared meals, debated history and confronted deeply rooted prejudices that had shaped generations. What seemed like a small civil society initiative was, in reality, an experiment in reconciliation.

Today, many of the ideas discussed during that journey are slowly becoming reality.

The renewed momentum in relations between Turkiye and Armenia represents one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus in decades. The significance of this process extends far beyond bilateral diplomacy. It reflects a wider regional transformation driven by war, shifting alliances, economic necessity and the urgent search for stability in an increasingly volatile neighborhood.

Recent developments would have been almost unimaginable only a few years ago. Ankara has announced that bureaucratic preparations for direct trade with Armenia have been completed and that efforts to reopen the long-closed border are ongoing. The border has remained shut since 1993, when tensions surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict pushed relations into complete diplomatic freeze.

For Armenia, the closure created profound economic and geopolitical consequences. It deepened the country’s isolation and increased its dependence on both Russia and Iran. Today, however, both of those traditional regional pillars are facing their own crises. Russia remains heavily consumed by the war in Ukraine, while Iran is struggling under the pressure of escalating regional conflict and confrontation with Israel and the United States.

Under these conditions, Armenia’s strategic calculations are changing rapidly.

The reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border would not merely facilitate trade routes or transportation networks. It would fundamentally reshape Armenia’s economic geography and expand its diplomatic maneuverability. For Turkiye, normalization would strengthen its influence in the South Caucasus while advancing its long-standing goal of becoming a regional connectivity hub linking Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

More importantly, however, normalization is gradually becoming a human story rather than simply a geopolitical one.

One of the strongest recent symbols of this transformation came with the decision by Ankara and Yerevan to jointly restore the medieval Ani Bridge, which once connected the two peoples along the historic Silk Road. The bridge itself is not merely an architectural structure. It is a metaphor for the broader process underway.

For decades, Armenians and Turks could see one another across closed borders, burdened by history and separated by political mistrust. The restoration of the Ani Bridge symbolizes something larger than infrastructure: it symbolizes the rebuilding of confidence, communication and coexistence.

Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz visiting Yerevan this month further underscored the seriousness of the current process. It marked the highest-level Turkish visit to Armenia in nearly two decades. Such diplomatic gestures matter because they demonstrate that normalization is no longer confined to rhetoric or symbolic meetings between special envoys. It is now increasingly visible at the highest political levels.

Yet describing this process merely as “normalization” may not fully capture its meaning.

Turkiye’s special envoy, Serdar Kilic, has accurately characterized it as a “trust-building process.” That distinction is critical. Formal diplomatic normalization — embassies, open borders and trade agreements — cannot endure without deeper reconciliation between societies.

Political agreements alone are insufficient when collective memories remain wounded and mutual suspicion persists. Sustainable peace requires human interaction. It requires educational exchanges, cultural diplomacy, tourism, business partnerships and direct communication between ordinary citizens.

This is why the growing emphasis on soft power initiatives between the two countries is particularly significant.

The announcement of reciprocal scholarships for university students is one example. Educational diplomacy often produces results that formal political negotiations cannot achieve. Students who study, travel and interact with one another develop perspectives that transcend inherited national narratives. These exchanges can create long-term constituencies for peace.

Similarly, Turkish Airlines launching flights to Yerevan since March represents more than commercial connectivity. Direct flights reduce psychological distance. They normalize contact. They create familiarity where isolation once dominated.

The planned reopening of the Kars-Gyumri railway carries comparable strategic importance. The rail line has remained inactive for more than three decades, symbolizing the frozen state of regional politics. If restored, it could reconnect Armenia not only to Turkiye but also to broader regional trade corridors extending toward Europe and Asia.

Armenian officials increasingly recognize that their country risks remaining economically marginalized if regional connectivity projects continue without Armenian participation. Turkiye, Georgia and Azerbaijan are already linked through major transportation and energy corridors. Armenia’s inclusion in these networks could significantly alter its economic future.

The current rapprochement has also been strongly shaped by the efforts of nonstate actors.

For years, journalists, academics, businesspeople and civil society organizations have quietly maintained channels of communication even when official diplomatic ties did not exist. These Track II diplomacy efforts played an indispensable role in preventing complete societal disengagement between Turks and Armenians.

Such initiatives often receive less attention than formal diplomatic negotiations, yet they are frequently more effective in transforming public attitudes. Governments can sign agreements, but reconciliation ultimately depends on whether societies themselves are prepared to coexist peacefully.

The geopolitical environment has also dramatically accelerated the normalization process.

Three major regional developments have pushed Ankara and Yerevan closer together: the Russia-Ukraine war, escalating tensions involving Iran, and Armenia’s peace process with Azerbaijan.

First, the broader regional instability surrounding Iran has created a shared security concern for Turkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan alike. All three states are attempting to avoid being pulled into wider regional conflict while simultaneously protecting their economic and security interests. This has encouraged unprecedented levels of diplomatic engagement and coordination.

Second, Armenia is gradually distancing itself from Russia.

For decades, Moscow positioned itself as Armenia’s primary security guarantor. However, Russia’s inability or unwillingness to decisively protect Armenian interests during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict severely damaged its credibility inside Armenia. Simultaneously, Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine has reduced its regional bandwidth and weakened its overall strategic influence.

As a result, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has increasingly pursued diversification in Armenia’s foreign policy. Engagement with Western institutions, closer ties with Europe and improved relations with neighboring states now form a central part of Yerevan’s strategic outlook.

Within this framework, improving relations with Turkiye carries enormous significance. Turkiye is not only a NATO member but also economically integrated with Europe through the EU Customs Union. For Armenia, normalization with Ankara potentially opens new economic opportunities and diplomatic channels previously unavailable.

The United States and the European Union have both strongly supported Turkish-Armenian rapprochement because they view regional stability in the South Caucasus as increasingly vital amid wider geopolitical fragmentation.

Third, Armenia’s peace agreement with Azerbaijan has fundamentally altered regional dynamics.

Pashinyan’s willingness to pursue peace with Baku and simultaneously engage Ankara demonstrates a major shift in Armenian strategic thinking. Unlike earlier Armenian leaders who often approached normalization cautiously due to domestic political constraints, Pashinyan has adopted a more pragmatic and economically driven approach.

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia will therefore serve as an important referendum on this broader foreign policy transformation. The central question facing Armenian voters is whether economic connectivity and regional integration should take priority over the rigid geopolitical paradigms of the past.

Unlike previous attempts at reconciliation, the current process is not driven solely by optimism or goodwill. It is also being propelled by geopolitical necessity.

The South Caucasus today sits at the intersection of multiple crises: the Russia-Ukraine war, instability involving Iran, shifting global trade corridors and intensifying great power competition. Under such conditions, prolonged hostility between Turkiye and Armenia has become increasingly unsustainable for both sides.

Shared economic interests, common security concerns and the urgent need for regional stability are creating incentives for cooperation that did not previously exist.

The restoration of a bridge in Ani may appear symbolic, but symbols often matter greatly in international politics. Bridges represent movement, communication and connection. For decades, the relationship between Turks and Armenians was defined by walls, silence and closed borders.

Now, slowly but unmistakably, those barriers are beginning to crack.

‘You have to be ready for war’: Legacy of limbo in Armenia after loss of Nago

Irish Times
May 17 2026

‘You have to be ready for war’: Legacy of limbo in Armenia after loss of Nagorno-Karabakh

A lightning quick offensive in 2023 saw Azerbaijan take control of the disputed region in a devastating blow to Armenia

Jack Power in Yerevan, Armenia

There’s a thick smell of incense in the air. It’s a Sunday morning and grieving mothers and fathers are bringing fresh flowers to the graves of sons who were killed in Armenia’s 35-year conflict with Azerbaijan.

In Yerablur military cemetery, high above the Armenian capital city, Yerevan, the dates on the headstones chart a history of the fighting for the disputed mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Rows and rows of Armenian soldiers killed during the first war, which lasted from 1988 to 1994, are buried here one after the other.

Walk on a little farther and you begin to pass all the graves of the men who died during a 44-day war launched by Azerbaijan in 2020.

A final, lightning quick offensive from Azerbaijan in 2023 took control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a devastating blow to Armenia, which forced 100,000 ethnic Armenians living in the enclave to flee their homes, possibly never to return.

One mother, Albina, explains how her 19-year-old son was killed by a grenade in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. “This is my son,” she says, resting her hand on the tombstone and wiping away tears. He was the youngest of three boys. “Every day we come to Yerablur,” she says.

The long uphill road to the military cemetery is called the Alley of Glory. Nearly all the tombstones include large pictures of the deceased in military uniform. Some show the soldiers holding Kalashnikovs or other rifles.

There are a lot of young faces. Above them flutter Armenian flags flying from tall poles posted beside every second or third grave.

Two brothers, both born in 1994, are buried in one plot together. The first was killed in the 2020 war and the other in 2023.

Nearby a father slowly unpacks a red plastic shopping bag, taking out a brush to clean the grave of his son, a casualty in 2020. “Nineteen years old,” he says, shaking his head.

Lots of the graves have small stands where families can burn incense when they visit. The father pulls out a small blowtorch to light some, before he begins carefully cleaning the headstone.

A priest – Armenia is a predominantly Christian country – is leading a large group in prayer.

One elderly couple is tending to the grave of their son who was killed in the first war three decades ago. He was 25 years old.

His mother takes a trowel to a flower bed that borders the plot, while his father sweeps away stray leaves. They spend the entire afternoon here.

A landlocked country of about three million people, Armenia is bordered by oil-rich Azerbaijan to the east, and another old foe, Turkey, to the west.

It’s a cloudy day but you can still make out the snow on Mount Ararat, the huge mountain that dominates the southwestern skyline beyond the Armenian capital.

Symbolically important to Armenians, the mountain lies in present-day Turkey, a daily reminder of the country’s history as a small piece on the geopolitical chessboard of the South Caucasus.

The territory was ceded in a 1920 treaty negotiated by Moscow that settled the borders of the republic of Turkey and the three then-Soviet republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

When the Soviet Union began to break up, rising tensions between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities led to the first Nagorno-Karabakh war.

A push to unify Armenia and the large population of ethnic Armenians in the border region, internationally recognised as Azerbaijan, unleashed a surge in ethnic violence in the late 1980s that escalated into a vicious years-long conflict between the neighbouring countries.

Armenian forces successfully established control of the enclave and several surrounding Azerbaijan districts before Russia brokered a ceasefire in 1994.

Hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were displaced from their homes, and forces on both sides were accused of committing atrocities and massacres.

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh set up a self-declared breakaway republic, Artsakh, which governed the enclave until 2023.

The uneasy ceasefire was tested at times by clashes and skirmishes, including four days of fighting in 2016, until an attack by Azerbaijan in September 2020 saw the resumption of full-scale hostilities.

“In 2020, when the war started, we had our place in the line and we went there,” says Harut Mnatsakanyan (33), who fought in a local unit assisting the Armenian army, alongside his older brother.

“I was born in 1992 during the first Artsakh war, so all my father’s generation was fighting,” he says. “I was married in 2016 and in 2020 I had two children when they started the war,” he says.

Mnatsakanyan, a political science graduate, had worked as a senior official in a regional province in the unrecognised Artsakh administration.

When he was 18 he completed two years of mandatory military service so he knew how to fight.

His unit was initially posted to a northern part of the front line, but was soon redeployed to the Shushi region where the fighting was heavier. “It was the most difficult part of the war,” he explains. “We did what we needed to do.”

Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, utilised a technological advantage on the battlefield to devastating effect, deploying waves of killer drones to push Armenian and local Artsakh forces backwards and reclaim a lot of territory lost in 1992.

“We lost people, too many,” Mnatsakanyan says. “I lost my own brother.”

His brother, Gurgen, had left cover to help two wounded Armenian soldiers. “After five minutes he hadn’t come back,” Mnatsakanyan recalls.

So he went out after him. He found his brother, shot in the side, near the two other soldiers he had run out to help.

“It was a difficult position, so nobody, and especially not an ambulance, could come,” he says. “I say: it’s my own brother. I have to save him.

“He couldn’t breathe, the blood was coming into his lungs … I could not stop the bleeding. So I dragged him, something like 800 metres, maybe one kilometre”.

Mnatsakanyan managed to help his brother into the back of a military jeep. “Before we got him to the hospital we lost him. He was 30 years old, married with two children,” he says. “We lost many people that day.

“It’s not a time to cry, it’s no time for emotion, or to grieve. You have to fight for you, for your country and for your friends,” he says.

After Azeri forces captured the strategically important city of Shushi, a ceasefire was negotiated by Russia, which committed to station peacekeepers in the region to guarantee the truce.

On the final day of the war Mnatsakanyan’s unit captured two Azerbaijani troops. “The other soldiers wanted to kill them, but we didn’t let them, because I think that you have the time for war, and also we have the time for life, for peace,” he says.

When he returned home after the war, the grief properly hit. “You don’t understand many things in the moment,” he says.

He thinks about his brother’s children who had lost their father and feels responsible. “I called him and asked him to join our group … My mother tells me that he’s your big brother and it was his decision to fight,” he says.

“Every day of course you remember him. I remember when I was small and he’d take me on his bicycle and go around our home, how we would swim together, play together. There’s not a day when it isn’t difficult,” Mnatsakanyan says.

“We cannot take flowers to his grave, his body is buried in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

In September 2023, after blocking off a land route bringing supplies from Armenia to the enclave, Azerbaijan launched another attack.

The offensive swept across the region, forcing the surrender and collapse of the Artsakh administration in a matter of days. The entire population of 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, turning entire cities and villages into ghost towns.

“It is very painful,” says Irina Arakelyan, a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh who has settled in Yerevan.

It was difficult to come to terms with the reality she might never be able to go back. “Accepting that fact, it would mean death,” she says.

A cultural centre in Yerevan run by an artist, Lilit Melikyan, turned into a muster point for arriving refugees.

Sitting in a workshop filled with traditional Armenian dresses, scarves and ceramic pots, Melikyan says the small centre had opened its doors to an earlier wave of refugees during the 2020 war. “There were a lot of people fleeing Artsakh overnight, 170 families appeared at the door asking, asking for help,” she says.

Volunteers collected and sorted donations of clothes for the women and children. “All these people … They were in their slippers and pyjamas,” she says.

A call went out across Armenia’s huge diaspora network in Russia, Europe and elsewhere asking relatives and friends to donate what funds they could to help.

The centre put on classes teaching embroidery, design, knitting and craftwork. “I’ll give you clothes or food [and] it’s enough for you for a day or two, but when you are given a skill it provides a way for you to make a living,” she says.

The vast majority of the previous wave of refugees had returned to Nagorno-Karabakh when the 2020 ceasefire bedded down.

But Melikyan realised after Azerbaijan’s absolute victory in 2023, there was little prospect of the hundred thousand displaced refugees seeing their homes again.

“We provided accommodation for families and then immediately, from the next day we started offering training,” she says. “We understood there will be no way back.”

“I don’t see any possibility of return,” says Tigran Grigoryan, who runs the Regional Center for Democracy and Security think tank.

“I think most of them do understand that it’s not possible to go back … The only realistic and reasonable scenario is to help people integrate in Armenia,” he says.

Speaking from a small basement office in Yerevan, Grigoryan, who is from Nagorno-Karabakh himself, describes the current truce as a “victor’s peace” weighted to favour Azerbaijan.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a “power vacuum” in the South Caucasus that Azerbaijan successfully took advantage of, he says.

Grigoryan, who served on Armenia’s national security council, says the failure of Russian peacekeepers to intervene during the 2023 offensive did lasting damage to ordinary Armenians’ trust in Russia, their old ally. “Azerbaijan chose the timing very, very well,” he says.

Since then things have shifted towards diplomatic and political channels.

Last August there was a real breakthrough that optimists hoped might finally draw a line under the 35-year conflict and normalise Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s authoritarian president Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration in the White House, at the urging of US president Donald Trump, billed as a precursor to a peace agreement.

“Nine months later, few are as happy,” says Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior researcher at the Applied Policy Research Institute in Armenia. The two countries had entered a sort of “no peace, no war” holding pattern, he says.

Azerbaijan wants Armenia to make certain changes to its constitution before Baku signs a peace deal.

Pashinyan appears willing to make constitutional amendments, though that hinges on him returning to government with a large majority following elections next month.

“If I would go to Las Vegas and bet, I would bet that probably this ‘no war, no peace’ situation will continue at least for one, two years probably,” Poghosyan says.

“There will be no peace agreement signed and ratified, probably there will be no border openings between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Turkey,” he says. That would leave things in a precarious, perhaps volatile, situation, says the analyst.

Below all that high politics, Mnatsakanyan is trying to build a new life in Yerevan with his wife and four young daughters.

“The two big sisters, they remember Artsakh,” he says. “I don’t want to traumatise them, but when they ask something, we show and tell them,” the former soldier says.

What does he think about the chances for a peace that lasts? “We can resolve the problem without war, but I think you have to be ready for the war, if you want the peace, you have to be ready for war”.


Early Ties with Asia Minor — Plans for a Hungarian–Armenian Alliance in 1218

Hungarian Conservative
May 17 2026

hen we think of Hungarian–Armenian relations, we tend to think primarily of the Armenians who settled in historical Hungary, particularly in Transylvania, since the 17th century. Yet these ties date back to the Middle Ages. On the occasion of the 2022 anniversary of the Golden Bull—one of the most important documents of Hungary’s historical constitution—there was much discussion of King Andrew II’s crusade.

In 1217 he became the only Hungarian monarch to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, from which he returned in early 1218.[1] Ahead of his army, the king travelled to Tripoli at the end of 1217 for a family event—specifically, the wedding of Bohemond IV, Prince of Antioch (1201–1216, 1219–1233), and Melisende, sister of King Hugh of Cyprus (r. 1205–1218). Andrew’s family ties entitled him to make this visit, as he was a cousin of the Prince of Antioch; Andrew’s mother, Agnès d’Antioch, was the daughter of the well-known crusader leader Renaud de Châtillon and Constance of Antioch.

It cannot be ruled out that King Andrew travelled by ship from Antioch to an Armenian port, and from there to Tarsus, the birthplace of the Apostle Paul, or perhaps further on to Sis, the capital of the Armenian Kingdom. The Crusader army certainly reached Cilicia—that is, Lesser Armenia—by land.

In the Middle Ages, there were in fact two Armenias: in addition to the territory known today, Armenian principalities began to emerge by the 1070s in the southeastern coastal region of present-day Türkiye, in the area of ancient Cilicia. From these, Prince Ruben (r. 1080–1095), founder of the Rubenid Dynasty, established Lesser Armenia, which lasted until 1375.

On his return journey from the Holy Land, the Hungarian king engaged in a remarkable amount of diplomatic activity. He behaved as one would expect from the head of a European middle power: he held talks with the leaders of the states he passed through, formed alliances, and forged diplomatic ties. His plan may also have been encouraged by the political détente among the countries of the region—the Latin Empire of Constantinople, Orthodox Byzantine Nicaea, and the Seljuk capital, Konya. As a result, from 1213/14 onward, the overland route through Asia Minor reopened and became safe.

‘[The Hungarian king] behaved as one would expect from the head of a European middle power’

In the Armenian city of Tarsus (today’s Mersin, Türkiye), King Andrew betrothed the only child of King Leo of Armenia (Levon the Magnificent I of Metsagorts, r. 1187–1219), Isabella (Zabel, 1215–1252), to his son, Prince Andrew (1210/12–1234). The bride’s lineage must have been attractive; Isabella’s mother was the daughter of the King of Cyprus and the Queen of Jerusalem.

Coins of King Leo I of Armenia PHOTO: Wikipedia

To this day, Hungarian historians remain baffled by the fact of the engagement. Most attribute this to the Hungarian king’s recklessness and haste, finding no serious motive behind the marriage plan.

In reality, by the early 13th century, the Kingdom of Armenia—which had become independent from the Byzantine Empire—had emerged as a significant factor on the political map of the Middle East and Asia Minor.[2] On the throne sat Leo, the kingdom’s founder, who by the 13th century had turned his country into a major hub of international trade, with its ports visited by both Venetian and Genoese ships.

Leo took advantage of the country’s exceptional geostrategic position: to the West, it served as the gateway to the Middle East. Leo consciously integrated Western, Frankish-style elements into his government and drew closer to the Latin kingdoms of the Holy Land. His soldiers were present at the siege of Acre and assisted King Richard the Lionheart of England in the conquest of Cyprus.

Frankish culture exerted a significant influence on Armenian secular society, though it is difficult to assess the extent and effectiveness of its reception. Leo remained tolerant toward the Latin Christian Church and even formally accepted the union with the Church. The Armenian prince requested a crown from the German emperor, whereupon in 1197 the imperial chancellor brought two crowns, one for the Cypriot ruler Aimery and the other for Leo.

‘Leo took advantage of the country’s exceptional geostrategic position: to the West, it served as the gateway to the Middle East’

Leo was crowned within the framework of a great ceremony on 6 January 1198, in the Cathedral of Saint Sophia in Tarsus—now the Great Mosque—in the presence of the Syrian Jacobite Patriarch and the Greek Metropolitan of Tarsus. The church became the site of the coronations of Armenian kings. For the ceremony, Nerses of Lambron, Archbishop of Tarsus, translated the Latin coronation liturgy into Armenian.

A unique ceremony took place, as while Leo was crowned and anointed with holy oil by Catholicos Gregory VI, head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the imperial regalia were presented on behalf of the emperor by Archbishop Konrad of Mainz, German Archchancellor and papal legate. At the same time, Leo was also crowned with a crown sent by the Byzantine Emperor Alexios III Angelos, which only served to reinforce the prestige of the new kingdom. With this act, the third Latin kingdom in the Holy Land was established, alongside Jerusalem and Cyprus.[3]

It is no coincidence that the Hungarian Holy Crown is often cited as a parallel to the dual Armenian coronation; King Béla III of Hungary had transformed it into its present form a few years earlier—perhaps as early as 1182—on the occasion of his son’s first coronation. At that time, an 11th-century Byzantine crown with Greek inscriptions, which was in the Hungarian treasury, was supplemented with crown bands bearing Latin inscriptions, the so-called Latin Crown.[4] The motivation in Hungary may have been the same as in Armenia: in territories bordering the Byzantine Empire, such a crown could signify legitimacy and, in the event of a weakening of Byzantine power, provide a legal basis for independence.

The main problem during Leo’s reign was the issue of succession to the Principality of Antioch. Raymond-Roupen, the son of Raymond of Antioch and Alice of Armenia and Leo’s nephew, was crowned ruler of Antioch in 1216, but was driven from the throne three years later, thwarting the Armenians’ plan to extend their power to Antioch. The war of succession, which began in 1201 following the death of Bohemond III, Prince of Antioch, lasted for nearly a quarter of a century.

Leo the Magnificent of Armenia PHOTO: Wikipedia

Leo was a shrewd politician who formed marital alliances with numerous rulers. Through his second marriage, he became the son-in-law of Aimery, King of Cyprus; his daughter from his first marriage, Rita (Stephanie of Armenia), married John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem; and his niece, Philippa, married Theodore I Laskaris, Emperor of Nicaea, though she was sent home in 1216. Leo won the friendship and support of both the Knights Hospitaller and the Teutonic Knights by granting them significant territories.

Thus, King Andrew arrived in Armenia just at the perfect time, as his kinship with the princes of Antioch—and, through them, with the Armenian dynasty—fit perfectly into King Leo’s plans. Moreover, Andrew was related to both the former Emperor of Constantinople and the current Latin Emperor. Leo rightly counted on the diplomatic support of the highly respected Hungarian king. This was facilitated by the fact that he had made his daughter his sole heir, which was made possible by Armenian canon law, which allowed for the transfer of royal power also to a female heir in the absence of a male heir.

King Andrew, of course, may have miscalculated and been overly impressed by the wealth and cultural vibrancy of the Kingdom of Cilicia. In preparation for the marriage, Andrew was likely accompanied by Armenians on the overland route he chose for his return journey, led by Chamberlain Jocelyn. Andrew could not have foreseen that Leo would die a year later, in 1219, which would cause serious domestic political instability. As a result, the Hungarian–Armenian marriage never took place, and Prince Andrew never made it to Armenia.

Leo’s daughter, Isabella, was subsequently given in marriage to Philip, son of Bohemond IV, Prince of Antioch, but their joint reign lasted only a short time. Philip not only looked down on Armenian church rituals, but his favouritism toward Latin nobles also outraged the Armenian nobility. Philip was stripped of his throne by the nobles, imprisoned, and died in captivity, perhaps as a result of poisoning. It is possible that the same fate would have befallen the Hungarian prince as well.

‘The Hungarian Armenian marriage never took place, and Prince Andrew never made it to Armenia’

Andrew likely envisioned a Hungarian empire, an ‘archiregnum Hungariae’, which would, above all, establish a strong, closely knit confederation in the Balkans and Asia Minor. We do not view the king’s 1219 letter to the pope as a pitiful explanation or defence at all, but rather as a boast. According to this, King Andrew boasted that everyone from Armenia to Bulgaria was his relative, and that even the Seljuk sultan was not averse to a dynastic alliance and baptism. As he writes:

Even if we returned against our will out of better judgment, during our fortunate return journey, we did no less good for the Holy Land than if we had remained around Jerusalem. For Leo, the renowned king of Armenia, wishing to gain greater strength through the union of our peoples to break the constant attacks of the neighbouring Turks, gave his daughter in marriage to our son…

One argument in favour of the plan’s deliberate nature is that, as he continued his journey, Andrew married Maria (Maria Laskarina, 1206–1270), the daughter of Theodore I Laskaris, the Greek Emperor of Nicaea (r. 1205–1221), to his son Béla (later King Béla IV), and betrothed Maria’s daughter to the Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Asen (r. 1218–1241). Apart from the Armenian betrothal, the marriages were consummated, and the Bulgarian wedding took place in 1221.

The king’s aforementioned letter to the pope reveals that the Hungarian king planned to marry his niece to the Seljuk Sultan Kaykaus I of Rum (r. 1211–1220). In the letter, Andrew wrote that ‘during our mission, the Seljuk sultan of Iconium [that is, Kaykaus I] also sent us an envoy, who said that if any of our daughters or relatives were to marry him, he would renounce his unbelief, convert to Christianity, and be baptized.’ This may be an exaggeration, but it is a fact that the sultan indeed reached out to the Crusaders, and in 1218, he even attacked the Ayyubid territories in Syria.

The Hungarian policy of ‘opening to the East’ around 1200 may have been the legacy of King Béla III, who was raised in Byzantium during his youth, as symbolized by the Holy Crown, which was assembled from Greek and Latin components. Among King Béla’s sons, Emeric (r. 1196–1204) assumed the title of King of Serbia in 1201, and as Prince Andrew, he took the title of King of Galicia and Volhynia in 1205. From the 1250s onward, Andrew’s son, Béla IV, styled himself King of Bulgaria.

The Habsburg rulers then held these titles until the end of World War I. King Andrew, of course, could not have known about the approaching Mongol armies, which not only reached Hungary by 1241 but also made Armenia a Mongol vassal in the 1240s. In fact, it was the Mongols who ruined Andrew II’s diplomatic masterpiece.


[1] Pál Engel, The Realm of St Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary 895–1526, London, 2001, p. 91.

[2] Mack Chahin, The Kingdom of Armenia: A History, London-New York, 2013, chapter 2/3.

[3] Ioanna Rapti, ‘Featuring the King: Rituals of Coronation and Burial in the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia’, in Alexander Beihammer, Stavroula Constantinou, and Maria Parani (eds), Court Ceremonies and Rituals of Power in Byzantium and the Medieval Mediterranean, Leiden, 2013, pp. 291–335.

[4] Endre Tóth, The Hungarian Holy Crown and the Coronation Regalia, Budapest, 2021.


‘On his return journey from the Holy Land, [King Andrew II] engaged in a remarkable amount of diplomatic activity. He behaved as one would expect from the head of a European middle power: he held talks with the leaders of the states he passed through, formed alliances, and forged diplomatic ties…As a result, from 1213/14 onward, the overland route through Asia Minor reopened and became safe.’

 

 

 

 

 

The Wanderer and the Sovereign: Mihály Ferdinandy

Tibor Joó and the Hungarian National Idea

No Russian Interest in Expanding the Confrontation with the West — An Interview with Vasif Huseynov